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TORT LAW: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF




Tort liability in the United States has been expanding at an ac-
celerating rate since the turn of the century. Medical malpractice
liability and products liability are the most notable examples of this
expansion; however, liability has expanded significantly in many
other areas as well. New actions have been created for wrongful
life,' wrongful birth,2 prima facie tort,3 refusal to settle,4 and wrong-
ful discharge. 5 We have also-seen the law of negligence expand in
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. A.A., 1963, Lincoln
College; A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982) (en bane);
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980);
Comment, On Determining Liability for "Wrongful Life". Curlender v. Bio-Science Laborato-
ries-A Step in the Right Direction?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 213 (1982).
2. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (en bane);
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). See
Note, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 65 (1981).
3. E.g., Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also Com-
ment, Tort Law: Porter v. Crawford & Co., 50 UMKC L. REv. 128 (1981).
4. See Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.
Fla. 1976); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389
(1978); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 822, 392 N.Y.S.2d 554
(Civ. Ct. 1977); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
5. See Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); Glenn v.
Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961);
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Frampton
v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton
R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Svento v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App.
644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (en banc); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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many significant ways. Potential liability for mental distress6 and pe-
cuniary loss 7 is rapidly increasing. Furthermore, the scope of negli-
gence liability generally is broadening due to the relaxation of tradi-
tional barriers to liability such as landowner immunities,8 status
immunities,9 and contributory negligence as an absolute defense.10
Clearly, not all jurisdictions are following all of these trends, but a
general movement toward greater liability is undeniable.
In recent years, potential defendants have become increasingly
vocal in arguing that their liability exposure is so excessive that it
adversely affects their willingness to engage in useful conduct. Such
arguments cannot always be taken at face value; potential defen-
dants have a strong economic incentive to protest all forms of liabil-
ity, both reasonable and unreasonable. However, the dramatic ex-
pansion of liability lends credence to these claims. In fact, many
eminent legal scholars have expressed concern that the traditional
tort system is rapidly becoming a compensation system, and, as such,
is unlikely to survive since the adversary system of justice cannot
operate efficiently as a system of social insurance.1 Empirical evi-
dence which would conclusively resolve the question whether tort lia-
bility has exceeded reasonable bounds in certain areas is as yet un-
available.1 2 However, the above concerns warrant an investigation
into the changes that are taking place because of the possibility that
they will cause adverse social effects.
This article will analyze the types of changes that are taking
place by examining three expanding areas of tort law: liability for
6. See Infra notes 20-110 and accompanying text.
7. See fnfra notes 111-41 and accompanying text.
8. See Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Alloca-
tion of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15.
9. ' See generally Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971)
(sovereign immunity); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969) (en
banc) (charitable immunity); Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 238 N.C. 24,
76 S.E.2d 553 (1953) (sovereign immunity); E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS, § 53.02 (3d ed. 1977) (immunity of municipalities); Casenote, 17 J. FAM. L. 810,
812 (1978-79) (spousal immunity); Note, Turner v. Turner: Abrogation of the Parental Im-
munity Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REv. 171, 177 (1981) (parent-child immunity).
10. For a general discussion of the development of comparative negligence see Wade,
Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in
Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299 (1980).
11. See Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV.
851, 918-20 (1981); Fleming, Book Review, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 614, 616.
12. E.g., Comment, Products Liability: The Impact on California Manufactuers, 19
AM. Bus. L.J. 343 (1981) (this study of the effects of the evolving products liability doctrine
on the manufacturers of farm implements is inconclusive in many important respects).
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negligently inflicted mental distress, negligently inflicted pure pecu-
niary loss, and harm caused by defective products. This examination
will demonstrate that the scope of liability can be increased in at
least two ways. One is by formally expanding the scope of existing
causes of action, e.g., relaxing arbitrary barriers to liability or ex-
panding the type of damages which may be recovered. A second
method is by relaxing judicial control over the jury. This relaxation
of control can take place in many forms. The least desirable form,
and the one upon which this article will focus, occurs when a court
submits a case to the jury under no standard or under standards so
vague or couched in such general terms as to provide no real guid-
ance. The effect of this is to permit-even force-the jurors to de-
cide the case on a basis of their own choosing.
The thesis of this article is that the first method of expanding
the scope of liability is often desirable, providing that social policy
justifies the expansion and the limits on liability are clearly defined.
On the other hand, the latter method of expanding the scope of lia-
bility is almost always undesirable because it permits cases to be de-
cided on an ad hoc basis without reference to a uniform principle.
Tort liability cannot successfully be used as a vehicle for implement-
ing social policy unless the policy is uniformly implemented in every
case. This can be accomplished only if a principled basis for decision
controls each case and if the basis of the decision is one that is likely
to further the underlying policy. The two methods of expanding the
scope of liability are not mutually exclusive because a given change
in the law can sometimes have both effects. Nevertheless, an analysis
of some specific areas of tort law where these methods have been
used, differentiating the two methods, can be helpful in formulating
rules in other areas that implement social policy on a uniformly prin-
cipled basis. Before we undertake this analysis, however, it will be
useful to begin with some discussion of the need for uniformity and
certainty in the development of rules of law and the roles of judge
and jury in this development.
In determining the appropriate allocation of power between
judge and jury it is useful to consider a paradox inherent in the law-
making function. Each rule of law is the product of an attempt to
achieve two conflicting and irreconcilable goals. 13 One goal is the
need to achieve certainty of result.1 4 Law is supposed to provide
13. R. KEETON, LEGAL CASES IN THE LAW OF TOR vii (1963).
14. Id.
1983]
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guidance for people's behavior. Society would be stifled if people had
no idea what sort of conduct was going to give rise to tort liability or
if they had no idea how to enter into-or avoid entering into-le-
gally enforceable business agreements. The other goal is the need for
flexibility. 15 A very rigid mechanical rule may work well in a typical
case and yet result in a serious injustice in unusual cases.
Driving on the wrong side of the two-lane, two-way road in a
no-passing zone provides an example of the tension between these
two goals. Certainty of result would be maximized by a rule stating
that a driver is always negligent if he drives in the left lane. Sup-
pose, however, that a driver swerves into the left lane of such a street
to avoid hitting a child who has darted into his path. Application of
the rigid rule to such a driver to hold him negligent is clearly unjust.
An alternative rule might be devised which leaves maximum flex-
ibility so that justice to the defendant can always be achieved. Such
a rule might be that people are negligent if they drive in an "inap-
propriate" lane of traffic. The problem with this rule is that it pro-
vides too little guidance. No driver could know for more than a min-
ute in advance whether the left or right lane was appropriate
because the decision would depend entirely upon what he found in
front of him (oncoming cars, for example) at any given instant. It is
obviously undesirable to attempt to achieve either goal to the com-
plete exclusion of the other.
A middleground must be reached which necessarily results in a
rule that is predictable in some cases and is flexible in others, the
"gray area" cases. For example, the rule might provide that one
must drive in the right lane unless there is an emergency that justi-
fies swerving into the left lane. This rule achieves certainty to a de-
gree because there are many cases which clearly do not constitute an
emergency (swerving to avoid a slightly bumpy stretch of road), and
there are some that clearly do constitute one (darting child). Flexi-
bility is also achieved to a degree because the term "emergency" is
sufficiently ambiguous so that some cases-the "gray area"
ones-can fairly be determined either way (swerving to avoid hitting
a dog).
The relative size of the "gray area," compared to the area
where the law is clear, will vary from rule to rule, depending on the
relative need for certainty. For example, many contract rules will
have smaller "gray areas" than many tort rules because people need
15. Id.
[Vol. 11:937
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 940 1982-1983
EXPANDING TORT RECOVERY
to be able to plan business transactions in advance, whereas torts by
definition are usually unplanned. This article is concerned with the
question of whether the discretion to determine how broad the "gray
areas" ought to be in a given field of tort law and to resolve cases
falling within the "gray areas" ought to lie with the judge or the
jury.
In typical negligence cases these functions are shared. The
judges set the parameters by defining the rule of law (e.g., reasona-
ble care as the standard of conduct) and by regulating the kinds of
cases the jury may consider. The jury also exercises discretion by
evaluating the defendant's conduct and determining whether it is
reasonable or unreasonable. This is distinguishable from its pure
fact-finding function as an evaluation which obviously calls for the
exercise of discretion.
At the time when the law of negligence developed, this division
of power was quite appropriate. Tort law was regarded as a way of
resolving disputes among individuals. The court determined that
fault was required in some cases and not in others. In those cases
where liability was based on fault the jury was a very appropriate
body to evaluate the conduct and determine whether it was reasona-
ble or not. This judgment is merely a reflection of community values,
and the jury is apparently just as qualified as the judge to determine
whether the conduct was reasonable, at least in the type of simple
accident cases that often arose in those days. When judges felt that
certain classes of defendants needed special protection for policy rea-
sons, they were free to intervene by devising arbitrary rules that
would prevent the jury from having an opportunity to decide many
of these cases. For example, special immunities were created to pro-
tect landowners and governments, and special defenses were created
to protect employers.1 6 In addition, certain general immunities were
derived which apply to all defendants. For example, liability for pe-
cuniary loss and mental distress was generally denied unless accom-
panied by physical harm.1 7
It is not clear that juries have always exercised their discretion
in an impartial manner. Many commentators have noted that juries
are often plaintiff-oriented."" Judges, however, do possess some
16. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinter-
pretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1767-72, 1775 (1981).
17. See infra notes 21, 112 and accompanying text.
18. That juries are often plaintiff-oriented has been noted by various commentators. See,
e.g., G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 77-78; Landes &
19831
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power to protect the parties from incorrect verdicts that are based on
such biases. The power to direct verdicts, for example, enables
judges to deny juries the opportunity to decide cases in which a find-
ing of negligence would be unreasonable. This is an important pro-
tection for defendants because it prevents a large class of cases from
reaching the jury room. Furthermore, judges may set aside verdicts
as being against the weight of the evidence.
Although this approach to allocating power continues to be used
today, it is inappropriate in many cases. Tort law today is often
thought of as a method of social engineering--encouraging socially
or economically useful behavior, deterring wasteful or inefficient be-
havior, spreading accident costs-rather than as simply a method for
resolving unrelated disputes among private individuals. 19 To succeed
as a method of social engineering, however, such a tort system must
operate as an integrated whole, with desirable policies defined clearly
and pursued consistently and uniformly. This can only be done when
such policies are implemented by someone with the ability to create
clear guidelines but who at the same time is sufficiently constrained
by the system to ensure the desired consistency and uniformity. An
examination of how such policies have been implemented in three
areas of tort law will demonstrate that more often it is the judge, not
the jury, who must have that power.
II. DAMAGES FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
The traditional common law rule is that there is no duty to pro-
tect another person from negligently induced mental distress.20 Such
damages can be recovered only if they are parasitic to another recog-
nized injury. Thus, one who negligently inflicts physical harm is re-
sponsible for resulting mental harm as well.21 Courts have given sev-
eral reasons for the traditional rule. First, it is undesirable to give a
remedy for trivial claims.2 Second, fraudulent claims are somewhat
more likely in the case of mental distress than physical harm since
such distress can easily be feigned.23 Third, granting an action for
Posner, supra note 11, at 917; Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1763-65.
19. G. E. WHITE, supra note 18, 63-113 (1980).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436A, 306 comment b (1965) [hereinaf-
ter cited as RESTATEMENT].
21. Id. at § 905 comment c; Maragos, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress-Mixed
Signals?, 8 W. ST. U.L. REV. 139 (1981).
22. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172-73; 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Note, The Expanding Definition of Liability-Dziokonski v. Babineau, 1
W. NEw ENGL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1979).
[Vol. 11:937
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mental distress creates the spectre of unlimited liability.24
This third reason is most germane to the subject of this article.
In a typical accident a certain limited number of individuals, usually
a small number, suffer what we shall call direct physical harm
-harm caused by the impact itself, e.g., the contact between the
front of a defendant's car and the plaintiff's leg, causing the fracture
of bone, the rupture of blood vessels, etc. The victims of such direct
physical harm will normally also suffer resulting mental distress,
e.g., pain and suffering, fright, panic, humiliation, etc.; such mental
distress may itself bring about physical manifestations which we will
call resulting physical harm-harm brought about not directly by
the impact, but rather by the victim's own mental state, e.g., loss of
sleep, high blood pressure, nausea, etc. For every individual who suf-
fers direct physical harm from an accident, however, there are many
others who will experience mental distress and even resulting physi-
cal harm. If a person is killed or seriously injured all his friends and
relatives and even some in neither category-a distraught bystander
frightened by the accident-are likely to suffer varying degrees of
mental distress as a result. Thus, limiting liability in such cases be-
comes a serious problem.
The use of foreseeability to limit such liability is not very help-
ful; it is always foreseeable that a great many third parties will suf-
fer mental distress as a result of the direct physical injury to each
person caused by an accident. Beyond that, mental distress is often
foreseeable even in situations where an accident does not occur; for
example, an individual who negligently forgets to invite an acquain-
tance to a party disregards a foreseeable risk of causing mental dis-
tress to the acquaintance. Thus, the traditional rule-limiting liabil-
ity for mental distress damages to only those plaintiffs who had also
suffered direct physical harm as a result of the defendant's negligent
act-was adopted to shield defendants from crippling liability.25
The trend, however, has recently been to relax this traditional
restriction on recovery for mental distress. This section of the article
will focus on the problem of accomplishing relaxation while at the
same time limiting the scope of liability within reasonable bounds.
The traditional rule was first liberalized so that even if the im-
24. See Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The
"Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 847 (1981); Note, supra note 23, at 797.
25. See Williams v. School District, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969); Brisboise v. Kansas
City Public Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957) (en bane); Chawkley v. Wabash Ry., 317
Mo. 782, 297 S.W. 20 (1927) (en banc).
1983]
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pact did not cause direct physical harm, the plaintiff could recover
damages for any resulting physical harm caused by mental distress
created by the situation, i.e., fear of the impact.28 A trivial impact,
harmless in itself, came to be recognized by many courts as an ade-
quate basis of liability, as long as physical harm resulted from
mental distress.2
Most courts have now abandoned the impact requirement and
permit recovery as long as the plaintiff was in the "zone of dan-
ger. '2 8 Under this approach, if the plaintiff is subject to the risk of a
physical impact, but the impact does not occur, the plaintiff can re-
cover for physical harm resulting from fright caused by the near
miss.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts [hereinafter "Re-
statement"] version of the zone of danger rule, a plaintiff can also
recover for resulting physical harm if he feared for the welfare of a
third person who was in the zone of danger, where that person was a
member of his immediate family who was in his presence.2 9 Permit-
ting a plaintiff to recover as a result of fright for a close relative
within his presence represents a further liberalization. Earlier courts
had taken the position that a plaintiff could not recover if the fright
was for a third person rather than for himself.80
Thus in many courts the traditional common law restrictions on
recovery have been considerably relaxed. A plaintiff can recover for
physical harm caused solely from the internal operation of mental
distress. Impact is no longer required as long as the plaintiff can
show that he was subject to the risk of an impact, and under some
limited circumstances the plaintiff can recover even though the
mental distress was suffered as a result of concern for the welfare of
a third person.3
The traditional zone of danger rule is sufficiently restrictive so
that the scope of potential liability is kept well within acceptable
limits. All persons are excluded from recovery except those that were
26. See Note, supra note 23, at 797-98.
27. Id. at 797.
28. Id. at 798.
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 436.
30. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84, 441 P.2d 912, 924
(1968) (en banc) (court summarizing developments in tort liability for mental distress); Lind-
icy v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59
Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); see generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220,
224-30 (1951).
31. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 436(3).
[Vol. 1 1:937
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subject to the risk of an impact. Furthermore, their mental distress
must have produced resulting physical harm, and some courts con-
tinue to require that the distress be caused by concern for himself
rather than concern for a third person. The combination of these
restrictions has the effect of precluding recovery in the great bulk of
situations where people experience mental disturbance from acci-
dents.
Some courts have gone beyond the zone of danger rule and now
permit recovery even where there is no risk of an impact to the
plaintiff himself. Our discussion will focus on one such court-the
California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg---for several reasons.
First, Dillon is the seminal case in this area. Second, the court's ap-
proach to expanding liability is an example of how such expansion
can appropriately be done while providing adequate protection to po-
tential defendants. Third, Dillon will provide a particularly apt con-
trast to a different case in a related area by the same court which
will be used later in this article as an example of an inappropriate
approach to expansion of liability.
In Dillon, the defendant negligently operated his car in such a
manner as to kill a small child. The plaintiff's mother witnessed the
accident and suffered such severe mental distress that physical harm
resulted. She brought an action seeking recovery for the physical
harm.3 3 The plaintiff would not have been able to recover under the
zone of danger rule because there was no risk that she would be
injured by the defendant's car herself. The court, however, rejected
the zone of danger rule as being arbitrary.34 It recognized that a
defendant can be negligent not only by virtue of subjecting a plain-
tiff to the risk of direct physical harm, but also by subjecting him to
the risk of such serious mental distress that physical harm is likely to
result.3 5 The court stated that this case would fall within the latter
category if it were foreseeable to the defendant that such harm could
result to the plaintiff.3 6 It held that the plaintiff could recover as long
32. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc).
33. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
34. Id. at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 924-925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
35. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
36. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. Note that this reasoning
is consistent with the Restatement, which permits recovery even when the plaintiff is not
within the zone of danger. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 20, at § 313. However, under the
Restatement, the plaintiff in Dillon would not be able to recover because she suffered the
mental distress as a result of concern for her daughter rather than concern for herself. Id. The
Dillon court expressly considered this limitation on liability and rejected it, too, as being arbi-
1983]
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as the defendant disregarded a foreseeable risk of physical harm to
the plaintiff regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered the mental
distress because of concern for herself or concern for a third party.3 7
The court restricted potential unlimited liability by creating a
three-factor test to be applied on a case-by-case basis by the trial
judge in determining whether there was a duty to the plaintiff. Only
if a favorable determination is made is the case submitted to the
jury.38 The factors are:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as con-
trasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only
a distant relationship.39
The Dillon court held that in light of these factors the defendant did
owe a duty to the plaintiff because it was foreseeable that the child's
mother might be near the scene and might suffer severe mental dis-
tress and resulting physical harm from witnessing the accident.' °
These factors restrict recovery to persons who witness an acci-
dent causing injury to a close relative.' 1 Nonwitnesses are precluded
from recovery because they lack a contemporaneous sensory obser-
vance (either sight or hearing) of the accident. 2 In essence, Dillon
expands the scope of the cause of action one small step beyond the
zone of danger rule by permitting witnesses of accidents to recover
even though they were not subject to the risk of physical impact.
While the Dillon court analyzed the case as if the sole issue was
whether the defendant disregarded a foreseeable risk of harm to the
plaintiff, it appears that the real purpose of the three Dillon factors
is to limit recovery to a specific class of plaintiffs' 3 rather than to
determine what is actually foreseeable to a given defendant." This is
trary. 68 Cal. 2d at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 924-25, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
37. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
38. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
39. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
40. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81..
41. See Note, supra note 23, at 809-10.
42. Id. at 803-10.
43. See Maragos, supra note 21, at 158.
44. See Note, supra note 23, at 807; but see Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of
[Vol. I11:937
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clear since the defendant is not required to know in advance that the
parent is present and therefore likely to observe the accident.45 In
effect, the factors merely present an arbitrary method for cutting off
a defendant's liability since mere foreseeability of harm would ex-
tend liability beyond reasonable bounds.46 The limitation chosen by
the court has a logical basis; one can easily agree, for example, that
a parent who witnesses the death of a child undergoes a more horri-
fying experience than a parent who hears about the death a short
time after it occurs. Consequently, the degree of distress suffered in
the former situation is likely to be greater than that suffered in the
latter, making the former a more appropriate case for an award of
damages. The limitation, however, is not based on foreseeability, as
both situations create foreseeable risks of serious mental distress and
resulting physical harm.4
Some writers have questioned whether the Dillon factors were
merely considerations that the jury could take into account in deter-
mining foreseeability, or whether they were criteria for the judge to
apply.48 In practice, subsequent cases have treated them as factors
for the judge to use in determining the duty question as as a matter
of law.'9
The Dillon factors have successfully expanded the scope of lia-
bility in cases where a bystander witnesses an injury to a third per-
son, but have done so without imposing excessive liability on poten-
tial defendants. For that reason they warrant further exploration.
The factors have been successful because in subsequent cases the su-
preme court and the lower appellate courts have tended to apply
them conservatively as criteria for determining as a matter of law
whether a defendant has the duty in a given case. Certainly not all
Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 583, 609 (1982).
(The authors argue that the intent of the court in Dillon has been undermined and the criteria
espoused have been transformed from guidelines for determining foreseeability into duty limi-
tations). Id. at 597.
45. See Note, supra note 24, at 857-58.
46. See Note, supra note 23, at 807-09.
47. It is indisputable that most parents who hear about the death secondhand will still
suffer grievous mental distress. The loss of a child is one of the most distressing events that a
human being can encounter. This has been recognized by the highest court in Hawaii, which
imposed a proximity limit on such recoveries, denying recovery to a grandfather who learned
about the death of a grandchild over long distance telephone lines. The court felt that the
grandfather could not be permitted to recover for practical reasons. See Kelley v. Kokua Sales
& Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
48. See, e.g., Note, supra note 24, at 864, 865.
49. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 44, at 589-97; Note, supra note 23, at 803-07.
50. The cases are discussed in the sources cited at note 49.
1983]
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of the subsequent California cases are consistent, but they tend to
fluctuate within a fairly narrow range so that predictability of result
is possible in the vast majority of bystander cases.
Some writers have forcefully argued that the factors have been
applied in an excessively rigid manner and that thus the Dillon rule
is little better than the old zone of danger rule.51 However, it undeni-
ably permits recovery in a broader range of cases than the zone of
danger rule, and yet still provides firm guidance. In that respect one
must conclude that the factor approach has been successful. If expe-
rience shows that the factors are excessively rigid, they might be
modified somewhat to broaden the scope of liability and still afford
adequate predictability.
The key to the success of the factors approach of Dillon is that
it requires the duty question to be decided as a matter of law, and
provides judges with firm criteria to be used in deciding the question.
Since all cases deciding the issue are subject to review in the state's
highest court, misapplication of the factors is easily remedied. After
sufficient precedents interpreting the guidelines accumulate, it ought
to be possible for results to be predictable in the broad range of fu-
ture cases.
Thus, in Dillon, the California Supreme Court determined as a
matter of law where the balance ought to lie between certainty and
flexibility; and in the gray areas where the law is flexible, California
judges exercise the discretion involved by determining as a matter of
law whether a duty to the plaintiff exists. They do this by consider-
ing the proximity of the plaintiff to the scene, his relation to the
victim, and the contemporaneity of his observance of the accident.
We now turn to a different line of cases involving mental dis-
tress damages. This area of case law provides a significant contrast
to the Dillon approach because recent expansions of liability in the
area were accomplished in an inappropriate manner-submitting the
policy question to juries on an ad hoc basis, rather than having the
policy decision made by courts and implemented uniformly in cases
as they arise.52
The area in question involves negligent infliction of emotional
distress without any accompanying physical harm. Cases granting
such recovery are an outgrowth of a more restrictive theory of recov-
ery-cases where the defendant disregards a foreseeable risk of
51. See, e.g., Nolan & Ursin, supra note 44, at 597.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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causing physical harm through mental distress rather than impact.53
That is, the defendant creates a risk of such severe mental distress
that physical harm was likely to result from the distress. For exam-
ple, suppose hospital personnel negligently confuse the identity of
newborn infants and send the wrong baby home with a new mother.
She could recover on showing (i) that it was foreseeable that switch-
ing babies would cause such severe distress to the mother that she
might suffer physical harm as a result of the distress and (ii) that
she did in fact suffer such physical harm." Here the impact rule and
its descendant, the zone of danger rule, have no application because
defendant did not disregard a risk of an impact. Logic requires in-
stead that the defendant merely disregard a foreseeable risk of phys-
ical harm through mental distress and that the distress result in
physical harm.
The Restatement recognizes this theory-of recovery for resulting
physical harm as well as some very specific limitations.55 While the
Restatement position obviously cannot faithfully embody the rules
recognized in every jurisdiction, it may usefully be studied both as
an example, along with Dillon, of a reasonable approach to the prob-
lem of limiting the scope of excessive liability and as a contrast to
later developments in the same area.
The Restatement version of this theory places certain restric-
tions on recovery which inherently prevent defendants from being
subjected to excessive liability. First, physical harm must result to
the plaintiff.56 Second, and probably more importantly, the defen-
dant must have disregarded a foreseeable risk of causing such result-
ing physical harm.57 A defendant who carelessly or even intention-
ally inflicts a moderate degree of mental distress upon another would
never be liable under the Restatement rule even if physical harm
results. This is because resulting physical harm is not a foreseeable
consequence of moderate mental distress. Accordingly, the foresee-
ability of resulting physical harm is an important restriction.
Third, the Restatement prohibits recovery where the plaintiff
suffered the mental distress as a result of concern for a third per-
53. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920; see
Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
54. The hypothetical is based on Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249
P.2d 843 (1952). Recovery was denied because the mother suffered no physical harm.
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at §§ 306, 312, 313, 436(1).
56. Id. at § 436A.
57. Id. at §§ 306 comment b, 312, 313(1)(b), 436(1) comment a.
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son.58 Concern for a third person can only result in actionable
mental distress where that distress is intentionally, rather than negli-
gently inflicted. 9 In Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital,"0 for example,
the mother of a newborn infant suffered physical harm as a result of
seeing hospital personnel negligently drop her baby on its head. The
plaintiff could not recover under the zone of danger rule since she
was never subject to the risk of a physical impact herself. She was
forced to rely on the theory that the defendant carelessly disregarded
a risk of causing such serious mental distress to the plaintiff-by
dropping her baby-that she was likely to suffer physical conse-
quences.8 1 The plaintiff was, however, barred from recovery under
the Restatement rule because she suffered the mental distress as a
result of concern for a third person-the baby-rather than concern
for herself.6 2 The Restatement would have permitted recovery only if
the defendant had intentionally dropped the baby for the purpose of
causing distress to the mother.6 3
The Restatement rule, like the Dillon factors, provides this area
of tort law with a restriction on liability that is certain enough, and
can be applied uniformly enough by courts, to allow potential defen-
dants to engage in useful conduct with assurance that liability for
negligence is sufficiently limited to afford protection from liability
disproportionate to the risk taken. However, at least two states
-California and Hawaii-have, in expanding liability from the Re-
statement base, substantially undercut the policies of uniformity and
certainty and in doing so have opened the door to excessive and un-
limited liability against potential defendants.
The California Supreme Court case, Molien v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospitals,"' greatly expanded the scope of recovery in mental
distress cases by eliminating the resulting physical harm require-
ment. In Molien, a doctor negligently examined and tested a woman
and erroneously concluded that she had syphilis. The defendant ad-
vised the woman to undergo treatment for the disease and to inform
her husband about the diagnosis. The husband, the plaintiff in this
case, also underwent testing to determine whether he had contracted
58. Id. at § 313(2).
59. Id. at § 312(b).
60. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
61. Id. at 684.
62. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 313(c).
63. See id. at § 312.
64. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (en banc).
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the disease. As a result of the diagnosis, the wife became upset and
suspicious that the plaintiff had engaged in extramarital sexual ac-
tivities. Tension and hostility arose, and this lead to a breakup of the
marriage.6 5
The plaintiff-husband brought suit, alleging that he suffered ex-
treme emotional distress as a result of the negligent diagnosis and
that this distress was foreseeable by the defendant-doctor. The plain-
tiff also sought recovery for loss of consortium occasioned by emo-
tional injury to his wife. The court held that the petition stated a
cause of action on both counts notwithstanding a failure to allege
resulting physical harm. Thus, the court recognized a new cause of
action for "negligent infliction of serious emotional distress." 6
The court rejected the resulting physical harm requirement as
being arbitrary and artificial,6 7 especially in light of the difficulty in,
distinguishing between physical and mental harm. 8 It stated that
the primary justification for the requirement is to guard against
fraudulent claims, 9 and concluded that "in the light of contempo-
rary knowledge. . .emotional injury may be fully as severe and
debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress. 70
Consequently, the court held that liability should be imposed if the
plaintiff suffered serious injury and that this is basically a question
of proof.71
Language in Molien also clearly indicates an intent to place
maximum discretion with the jury in such cases. The court stated
that the seriousness of the mental distress claimed is a matter of
proof to be presented to the trier of fact.72 It felt that "[tihe screen-
ing of claims on this basis at the pleading stage is a usurpation of the
jury's function. 173 The standard of proof, according to the court, was
to be merely "some guarantee of genuineness in the circum-
stances. 174 The court concluded that "the jurors are best situated
to determine whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct
65. Id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
66. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal Rptr. at 839.
67. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
68. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
69. Id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
70. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
71. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 171, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
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caused emotional distress, by referring to their own experience.17 5
This conclusion is bolstered by Molien's great reliance on Rod-
rigues v. State.78 This is a Hawaii case involving a suit by property
owners for mental distress caused by the defendant's negligent dam-
aging of the property. The highest court in Hawaii agreed that the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for negligently inflicted emo-
tional harm despite the fact that they had not suffered any resulting
physical harm. The court did so by placing great discretion with the
jury.
Rodrigues recognized that the need to protect defendants from
potentially unlimited liability was an important consideration.7 7 Ac-
cordingly, the court stated that it was appropriate to restrict recov-
ery to cases where the mental distress is "serious. 17 8 The court pro-
posed to implement this standard by adopting an objective test,
holding that "serious mental distress may be found where a reasona-
ble man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."MO (The Molien court quoted this language with apparent ap-
proval, 80 but it is not clear that Molien adopted this as a standard of
recovery). Viewed objectively, this standard might appear to be
stringent enough to restrict adequately the scope of potential liabil-
ity. Unfortunately, Rodrigues indicates that the court will not use
the seriousness criteria to restrict recovery to the most severe cases.
Rather, trial judges will normally submit cases to juries and permit
the jurors to decide, on the basis of their experience, whether the
plaintiff has suffered serious mental distress.
An analysis of Rodrigues bears this out.81 In that case the de-
fendant negligently failed to clean out a drainage culvert. As a re-
sult, the plaintiff's house was flooded to a height of six inches, caus-
ing extensive damage to the house and its furnishings. Mr.
Rodrigues testified that he was "'heartbroken' and 'couldn't stand to
look at [the house].' "182 Mrs. Rodrigues testified that she was
75. Id. (citations omitted).
76. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). See Molien v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
77. 52 Hawaii at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 519-20.
78. Id. at 172, 472 P.2d at 520.
79. Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
80. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 837-38.
81. 52 Hawaii at 175 n.8, 472 P.2d at 521 n.8.
82. Id. at 159, 472 P.2d at 513.
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"'shocked' and cried because [she and her husband] had waited
fifteen years to build their own home." 8 3 There was no proof of trau-
matically induced neurosis or psychosis. Nor was there any allega-
tion of inability to function normally in the work or social environ-
ment. Without such allegations, it is difficult to see how the case
involves a violation of the court's own standard, i.e., that a reason-
able person would be unable to cope adequately with the mental dis-
tress engendered by the circumstances of the case.
The defendants argued that the new standard left juries without
sufficient guidance.8 In response, the court conceded that it intended
to shift a greater part of the burden of administering mental distress
claims from the courts to juries.85 The court stated "the jury, repre-
senting a cross-section of the community, is in a better position to
consider under what particular circumstances society should or
should not recognize recovery for mental distress."'86 The court
stated that the jury is the appropriate body for determining whether
people can reasonably be so attached to their property that they
might reasonably suffer serious mental distress as a result of damage
to that property.87 Of course, it is still appropriate for the trial court
to direct a verdict where no reasonable person could believe that se-
vere mental distress could result,88 but the court clearly indicated an
intent to give maximum discretion to the jury.
The Rodrigues court elected to resolve mental distress cases by
applying the same general tort principles that are applied in direct
physical harm cases with the additional criteria that the mental dis-
tress be serious.89 The court indicated an intention to give great dis-
cretion to juries in determining the propriety of awarding damages
for mental distress. One writer who advocated this approach has
summed up the result as follows:
The guidelines are few and broad: with respect to duty, the jury
must find objectively verifiable actions by defendant and a reasona-
bly foreseeable risk to a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff; with re-
spect to limiting liability, the test is one of seriousness. With the
exception of the seriousness requirement, this is simply a standard
83. Id.




88. Id. at 175, 472 P.2d at 521.
89. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520-21.
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negligence equation with all of its attendant problems of proof.90
That writer argues that jurors are best suited to determine the genu-
ineness of claims, in light of modern medical information and the
testimony presented,9 1 because the jury can draw upon its life exper-
iences to determine the extent of the damage."'
This approach, however, fails to restrict the scope of liability to
only the most severe cases of mental distress. This creates the risk of
subjecting defendants to excessive liability. This is not meant to im-
ply that damages for "pure" mental distress, no matter how serious,
should never be recoverable. The rationale of Molien-that a cause
of action is justified because "emotional injury may be fully as se-
vere and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserving of
redress"93-is noteworthy. Several authors have agreed that it is un-
fair to deny recovery to such deserving plaintiffs. For example, au-
thors of a recent article94 have argued that severe and debilitating
emotional harm can cause interference with normal employment or
household duties, and relationships with other persons. Furthermore,
such distress can cause a person to become "unproductive, dis-
tracted, aimless, and prone to fits of temper or emotional out-
bursts. '9 5 Such serious emotional distress can include "'traumati-
cally induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression or phobia."'"
It can also result in physical harm such as strokes, miscarriages,
heart attacks, physical exhaustion, muscle tension, and loss of
strength.9 7 These authors argue that the seriousness criteria is an ap-
propriate screening device, and it should be used to "select for com-
pensation those cases that are most deserving." '98 The difficulty is
that the standard adopted by Rodrigues and Molien in no way as-
sure that only such devastatingly serious cases of mental distress will
result in recovery. Neither court apparently requires either pleading
or proof of the sorts of specific manifestations of severe mental dis-
tress described above. Rather they prefer to have the jury determine
90. Maragos, supra note 21, at 157-58 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 157.
92. Id. at 155-56.
93. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 832.
94. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 44, at 617.
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id. (quoting Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823,
167 Cal. Rptr. at 841).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 611.
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whether the distress was serious by evaluating the conduct in light of
human experience.
Juries with such broad discretion will probably not uniformly
restrict recovery only to cases of very serious mental distress. For
one thing, it is commonly believed that juries sometimes disregard
instructions and decide cases on the basis of emotion.99 This may be
an inevitable cost of the jury system, and one well worth paying, but
the Rodrigues approach maximizes the risk of this occurring because
it does little to screen out cases involving trivial distress. If the jury
is permitted to find that a six inch flood of a home is likely to cause
serious mental distress, then a great many similar cases-which po-
tentially involve only minor distress-will be submissible.
Furthermore, even in cases where the jury honestly attempts to
restrict recovery to cases of severe mental distress, the approach is
inconsistent with the suggestion that the seriousness requirement be
used as a screening device to limit liability by restricting recovery to
claims that are most serious, and thus most deserving of recovery.
The seriousness of the harm will vary with the circumstances of each
individual case. The seriousness requirement cannot be used to con-
sistently grant recovery only in the most deserving (most serious)
cases because a different jury will decide each case without reference
to any other mental distress case. If the mental distress produced by
a six inch flood presents a jury question, consistency of result is not
likely to be obtained. Some people would regard such distress as triv-
ial or moderate, while others might find it to be serious. The result
would depend on the composition of the jury in any given case. If the
facts of Rodrigues present a jury question, it is difficult to imagine
very many cases that do not present jury questions. Potential defen-
dants and their insurance carriers would have to be concerned be-
cause the approach creates the potential for an enormous increase in
the scope of liability. They are not assured that recovery will be lim-
ited to cases of severe mental distress.
It is useful to compare the Molien-Rodrigues standard with
that adopted in Dillon v. Legg.100 In Dillon, trial courts were given
specific standards to apply in determining whether cases could be
submitted to juries.10 1 These standards were sufficiently specific so
that in future cases one would expect a fair degree of uniformity of
result. By contrast, in Molien and Rodrigues, lower courts and juries
99. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
100. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (en banc).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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were only given vague general standards, i.e., foreseeability of risk to
the plaintiff and of serious mental distress. Both courts emphasize
that it is a jury function to apply these standards and to determine
such questions on the basis of life experience. Trial courts are not
encouraged to exercise jury control. They still have the power to
withhold cases from juries on the basis that no reasonable person
could conclude that the risk was foreseeable or. that the distress was
serious, but they are certainly not encouraged to exercise that power
freely. Furthermore, if the courts were to attempt to control juries
by directing verdicts, each court would have to do so on its own by
establishing its own guidelines concerning how to impose this vague
standard. The Molien and Rodrigues courts set no tangible, work-
able standard.
Since Dillon and Molien take fundamentally different ap-
proaches to the problem of limiting liability for mental distress, it is
not clear how courts will decide which approach to apply in future
cases. This is important because it can affect the ultimate scope of
liability. Suppose a doctor negligently diagnosed the plaintiff's wife
as having terminal cancer. After being informed of the diagnosis, the
plaintiff suffered serious mental distress because of concern for his
wife. Would the California court in such a case apply Molien and
permit the plaintiff to recover upon a showing that it was foreseeable
to the doctor that negligent diagnosis of cancer would cause mental
distress to the spouse, or would the court apply the Dillon v. Legg
factors and preclude the husband's recovery because he was not pre-
sent at the time that the negligence took place and because he heard
about the negligence from a third person rather than having received
it himself directly?
Molien did not repudiate the Dillon factors; it instead distin-
guished Dillon as a case involving a percipient witness to an accident
involving a third person, rather than a case like Molien where the
plaintiff was a "direct" victim of the defendant's negligence.1 02 The
ourt stated that the underlying issue in such cases is foreseeability
of harm and that in Molien the tortious conduct was directed to the
plaintiff as well as to his wife.103 The court reached this conclusion
by demonstrating that the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reason-
ably foreseeable: "It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis
of syphilis and its probable source would produce marital discord
102. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 834-35.
103. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
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and resultant emotional distress to a married patient's spouse. ' 1°4
The court stated that foreseeability was bolstered in the case because
the doctor told the plaintiff's spouse to inform the plaintiff about the
disease.105 Hence, the Dillon factors did not apply in Molien because
plaintiff was a direct victim of the negligence.
That raises the question of how to ascertain whether a person is
a direct victim. Foreseeability of a risk of harm to plaintiff is one
possible criterion. If a risk of harm to the plaintiff is foreseeable,
then he is a direct victim. Under this view the husband, in the mis-
diagnosis of cancer hypothetical, is a direct victim of the doctor's
negligence because it is foreseeable that the patient's spouse will suf-
fer distress upon hearing of the diagnosis. A problem with using
foreseeability as the criteria for determining directness is that-if
carried to its logical extreme-it would completely supercede Dillon
v. Legg. That case was decided on the explicit assumption that a risk
of harm to the bystander witness was foreseeable, and that the de-
fendant was negligent in disregarding an unreasonable risk of harm
to the bystander. Using this reasoning, the plaintiff in Dillon was a
direct victim of defendant's negligence.
An alternative method of determining directness is to ascertain
whether the plaintiff suffered emotional shock as a result of a risk of
harm to himself (direct victim) or as a result of harm to a third
person (indirect victim). In this latter case the plaintiff is always un-
foreseeable as a matter of law unless the three Dillon factors are
met. Some language in the Molien opinion supports this interpreta-
tion, and the holding of the case is consistent with it. The plaintiff's
mental distress in Molien resulted from a personal loss-the breakup
of his marriage. Under this view the husband in the cancer misdiag-
nosis hypothetical would be unable to recover unless he satisfied Dil-
lon because he was distressed about the condition of a third person,
his wife. While it is too early to tell if either of these competing
theories will be used to determine directness, some subsequent Cali-
fornia appellate court decisions have apparently used the latter the-
ory. In Cortez v. Macias,06 a child died at the emergency room of a
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980); see Maragos, supra note 21, at
154-55 (criticizing Cortez and arguing that plaintiff could have been characterized as a direct
victim). See also Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435
(1981) (distinguishing Molien from Dillon on the basis that Dillon applies to bystander cases.
Id. at 737, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440.)
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hospital because of the alleged negligent refusal of a doctor to leave
his home and treat the child. The mother brought an action against
the doctor for mental distress. The appellate court refused to apply
Molien, and denied the plaintiff recovery because she was not a di-
rect victim.
The method of determining who is a "direct" victim will signifi-
cantly affect the scope of liability for mental distress actions in Cali-
fornia. If foreseeability is used as the criteria for identifying direct
victims, the Dillon approach could be severely restricted or even
completely abrogated. Several writers advocate this.107 It is an obvi-
ous fiction to claim that the three Dillon factors are really used to
determine foreseeability. Recognition of this could lead to less reli-
ance on the factors in future cases. If this is done the scope of liabil-
ity for negligently inflicted mental distress in California would be
significantly expanded because many more cases would get to the
jury. The Dillon factors preclude most cases where distress is exper-
ienced as a result of concern for a third party from getting to the
jury. If the factors no longer applied, Molien would permit all such
cases to go to the jury as long as reasonable people could believe that
a risk of serious mental distress was reasonably foreseeable. The
third party limitation is an arbitrary but effective limit on the scope
of liability. If the Dillon factors are retained in all cases where dis-
tress is experienced because of concern for a third person, then the
range of application of Molien is considerably narrowed.
In the event that Molien only applies when plaintiff suffers dis-
tress because of concern for himself, then the case still represents a
more expansive rule than the Restatement because the Restatement
requires that defendant disregard a foreseeable risk of causing physi-
cal harm by inflicting mental distress, and it requires resulting physi-
cal harm.10 8 The Restatement definition of resulting physical harm is
sufficiently restrictive so that it can be applied to preclude recovery
in a great many cases. The definition is:
The rule stated in this Section [non-liability] applies to all
forms of emotional disturbance, including temporary fright, ner-
vous shock, nausea, grief, rage, and humiliation. The fact that
these are accompanied by transitory, non-recurring physical phe-
nomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting, and
the like, does not make the actor liable where such phenomena are
107. See Note, supra note 19, at 154-58; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 44, at 609.
108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at §§ 436, 436A.
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in themselves inconsequential and do not amount to any substantial
bodily harm. On the other hand, long continued nausea or head-
aches may amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and
even long continued mental disturbance, as for example in the case
of repeated hysterical attacks, or mental aberration, may be classi-
fied by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental charac-
ter. This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem, rather than
one of law.10 9
The line between physical harm and mental harm is necessarily an
arbitrary one, and it is possible to define resulting physical harm so
broadly as to include most forms of serious mental distress.11 0 In a
jurisdiction where this has been done, the elimination of the physical
harm requirement would probably not represent a significant expan-
sion of the scope of liability.
To sum up, Dillon and Molien represent two approaches to ex-
panding the scope of liability for mental distress, one good and one
bad. Foreseeability by itself is not adequate to limit the scope of
liability. If the Molien approach of governing cases strictly with ref-
erence to foreseeability of a risk of serious mental distress is applied
to all future mental distress cases-including ones where the distress
is caused by concern for a third person-then the risk of uncon-
trolled liability will be very real for two reasons. First, a geometric
increase in the number of actionable claims would result because
every harm to one person-whether it be physical, mental, or pecuni-
ary-potentially gives rise to numerous mental distress claims by
that person's friends and relatives. It is not clear that tortfeasors
could afford to pay for all of these claims even if liability is re-
stricted to cases of serious distress. Whether such liability ought to
be imposed is a question of policy which is beyond the scope of this
article. The second reason, which is the concern of this article, is the
practical problem of implementing the policy of compensating only
for serious distress. Mental distress falls on a continuum from trivial
distress on one extreme to very severe distress on the other. Where
the line is to be drawn along that continuum is the policy question,
and it ought to be implemented consistently. Submitting such cases
to the jury under very vague guidelines cannot achieve this consis-
tency since each jury may have a different concept of "serious" dis-
109. Id. at § 436A comment c.
110. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 926, 928-29, 616 P.2d 813,
818, 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836, 838-39 (1980) (en banc) ("a shock to the nervous
system"); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
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tress. On the other hand, Dillon v. Legg represents an example of a
proper approach: The state's highest court establishes relatively clear
standards to be considered in the trial court's determination of
whether a particular case should be given to the jury. A fair degree
of consistency can be expected from such an approach.
III. PURE PECUNIARY Loss
An area of significant expansion in the scope of liability is that
involving negligently inflicted pure pecuniary loss. The traditional
common law rule gave a cause of action only for negligently inflicted
physical harm to person or property.""1 With physical harm as the
basis of the action, pecuniary loss, such as lost profits and wages,
could be recovered only as "parasitic" damages."12 There are a num-
ber of well-recognized exceptions to this rule, the major one being
liability for negligent misrepresentation that results in pecuniary
loss.113 Closely related to this exception is the liability sometimes im-
posed on the supplier of services which involve something other than
supplying information, e.g., liability of a person who negligently
prepares an invalid will to the intended benficiary; liability of a tele-
graph company that negligently transmits a message.11 4
The most likely reason for the limitation of liability to cases
involving physical harm is the belief that a limitation of this sort is
necessary to protect potential defendants from liability so potentially
excessive as to subject them to an unreasonable burden.11 5 For exam-
ple, a defendant who negligently causes a fire in a business is liable
to the owner of the business for physical harm to property and for
lost profits if the owner can prove them with sufficient specificity. 16
The defendant is not liable to the employees of the business who may
suffer a loss of wages during the period that the business is closed, 17
to the suppliers of the business who suffer a loss of sales during the
Ill. See Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App. 1946); James,
Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal,
25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 43-44 (1972); Probert, Negligence and Economic Damage: The Califor-
nia-Florida Nexus, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 485 (1981).
112. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 766C comment b; Probert, supra note I11,
at 485.
113. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at §§ 552, 766C comment e.
114. Id. at § 766C comment e.
115. Id. at comment a.
116. Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 1974).
117. Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio App. 1946).
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time that the business is closed,11 or to the customers of the business
who suffer a disruption because their usual source of supply has be-
come unavailable. 119 The financial repercussions of such accidents
are almost inevitable and may affect a great many people other than
the direct victims of the accident. Furthermore, such pecuniary
losses can occur even when there is no physical harm to person or
property. A defendant who negligently causes a plaintiff to miss a
day's work by blocking traffic foreseeably causes pecuniary harm
that potentially radiates far beyond the plaintiff's immediate loss of
wages.
In the past, courts have restricted potential liability in such
cases by restricting recovery for interference with an existing con-
tract or interference with a prospective economic advantage to inten-
tional interferences. 20 The defendant must either act for the purpose
of interfering with a contract or the prospective economic advantage
or he must act with knowledge that such interference is substantially
certain to result.1 21 Such knowledge cannot exist unless the defen-
dant knows of the specific contract1 22 or prospective advantageous
economic relationship. This requirement places an effective limit on
the scope of liability.
In J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory 23 the Supreme Court of California
created a cause of action for negligent interference with prospective
advantage. The plaintiff operated a restaurant in premises that he
leased. The landlord entered into a contract with the defendant to
renovate the premises. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negli-
gently failed to complete the renovations within a reasonable time in
breach of his contract. The breach caused the plaintiff to lose busi-
ness, and thus lose profits, because it could not operate the restau-
rant during part of the construction period. The trial court sustained
a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia reversed, holding that negligent loss of expected economic advan-
tage is actionable under these facts. 24
The court determined that the following six-factor test be used
for ascertaining whether a duty exists in such cases:
118. Id.
119. Id. at 204.
120. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §§ 766, 766B.
121. Id. at §§ 766 comment j, 766B comment d.
122. Id. at § 766 comment i.
123. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
124. Id. at 805, 598 P.2d at 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
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(1) [T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the in-
jury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.12 5
The court rejected the excessive liability argument. It stated that the
six-factor test and the ordinary principles of tort law such as proxi-
mate cause are adequate to limit potential liability.126 According to
the court, the factors limit recovery by requiring foreseeability of the
injury and a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plain-
tiff's injury. 27
The six-factor test is to be used by the court to determine duty
as a matter of law. 2 The nature of the test is such that all factors
probably need not be met in order for the court to impose a duty. 129
Furthermore, ,other factors may be considered when appropriate,
such as the public policy favoring organized activity by workers' 30
and risk of deterring the actor from fulfilling his duty to the
government. a'
The six-factor test was devised and originally used by a Califor-
nia court for the purpose of determining when it is proper to hold the
125. Id. at 804, 598 P.2d at 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (citation and footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 808, 598 P.2d at 65, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
127. Id. at 808, 598 P.2d at 65-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
128. See id. at 804, 598 P.2d at 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410. See also Gay v. Broder, 109
Cal, App. 3d 66, 74, 167 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1980); Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466,
79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
129. The J'Aire court derived its six-factor test from Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958) (en bane). See J'Aire, 24 Cal. 3d at 804, 598 P.2d at 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
410, In Bilakanja the intended beneficiary of a will sought to recover damages from the notary
public who had improperly prepared the will. In finding that the plaintiff should be allowed to
recover despite the absence of privity, the court enumerated and applied the six factors. The
court prefaced its enumeration of the factors as follows: "The determination whether in a
specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are [the six factors]." 49
Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. See also DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelty Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d
1340, 1349 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (assuming the J'Aire criteria to be
"merely considerations to be blended from case to case"); Gay v. Broder, 109 Cal. App. 3d 66,
74, 167 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1980) (list of factors in Biakanja not intended to be all-inclusive;
liability dependent upon judicial weighing of policy considerations); Stoiber v. Honeychuck,
101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 930-31, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 208-09 (1980) (not considering each factor
separately); Chameleon Eng'g Corp. v. Air Dynamics, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 418, 423, 161
Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (1980) (moral blame not a factor to be considered in this case).
130. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804 n.l, 598 P.2d 60, 63 n.1, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 410 n.1 (1979).
131. Gay v. Broder, 109 Cal. App. 3d 66, 75, 167 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1980).
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negligent drafter of an invalid will liable to intended beneficiaries of
the will for the resulting lost legacies.132 A similar test has also been
used by other courts to determine whether an individual who makes
a negligent misrepresentation is liable to a person other than the in-
dividual to whom the representation was made.133 The Restatement
takes a closely analogous approach in negligent misrepresentation
cases,1 34 Rather than rely on pure foreseeability, the Restatement
limits the liability of one negligently supplying false information to
those persons who are either known or intended recipients of the in-
formation and to those transactions which he either intends to influ-
ence or knows that the information will influence.1 31 J'Aire expanded
the scope of liability by simply applying an established test to all
cases of negligent interference with prospective advantage rather
than limiting its application to a few specific instances.
J'Aire involves basically two issues. The first issue is the desira-
bility of expanding the scope of liability to include a greater number
of cases involving pure pecuniary loss. The second issue is deciding
the best approach to achieving this expansion of liability. The resolu-
tion of the first issue must be based on an evaluation of social policy.
Considerations of compensation and deterrence must be weighed
against the possibility of placing excessive liability on potential de-
fendants which might unduly inhibit their willingness to engage in
otherwise useful conduct. This author will not attempt to resolve the
question whether increased liability is desirable in such cases. It is
clear that in substituting negligence for intent as the basis of liabil-
ity, J'Aire did significantly broaden the scope of liability in prospec-
tive advantage cases.
The second issue is the propriety of the court's approach to im-
plementing the policy of expanded liability. In this regard, the J'Aire
decision is sound. By using a six-factor test to determine the duty
question as a matter of law, the court has taken responsibility for
defining the scope of liability. Each trial judge must use the same
factors to resolve individual cases. All decisions at the trial level are
subject to review by intermediate appellate courts and ultimately by
the state's highest court. While it is too early to tell how the factors
132. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
133. Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
See Probert, supra note 111, at 496-97; Casenote, Aluma Kraft Manufacturing Co. v. Elmer
Fox & Co., 39 Mo. L. REV. 466 (1974).
134. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 552; Probert, supra note I11, at 496.
135. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 552.
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will be applied, it is quite possible for courts to apply them consist-
ently to a wide variety of cases. If this approach were taken, then
over a period of years, the case law should become sufficiently devel-
oped so that a degree of predictability is achieved. For example, the
factors could be applied conservatively so as to permit recovery only
when the third person who was injured is either identified (or the
defendant knows that such person exists even though he does not
know his identity) and the prospective advantage of which the third
person is deprived is known or clearly contemplated by the defen-
dant.' 6 J'Aire itself is clearly such a case since the defendant knew
specifically of the plaintiff's identity and was specifically told by the
plaintiff about the harm that he was suffering.3 7
The J'Aire case is very similar to Dillon v. Legg'38 in that both
cases adopt a proximity test as the basis for limiting the scope of
liability. The Dillon test is more specific because it deals with a nar-
row situation-bystander recovery for mental distress. The J'Aire
test is necessarily more general since it can apply to all prospective
advantage cases. It is also more flexible because in addition to re-
quiring close proximity (knowledge of the plaintiff and the transac-
tion involved) it also permits relevant policies such as the need for
deterrence to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Both cases deny
recovery in many situations where pure foreseeability would yield a
different result because very close proximity between the negligence
and the harm is required.
By way of contrast, if a rule similar to that adopted in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals'39 had been adopted-foreseeability of
serious harm-responsibility for limiting the scope of liability would
largely have fallen to the jury by default because the criteria for
limiting liability are regarded as questions of fact for the jury. At
the same time, the standards are quite vague because reasonable
people can easily disagree concerning what risks are foreseeable and
what harms are serious. These criteria could be applied in such a
way as to increase vastly the scope of liability over and above that
actually imposed by J'Aire. As stated earlier, financial repercussions
to third parties are an inevitable result of most accidents140 and thus
136. See Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Probert, supra note 111, at 489-90; Casenote, supra note 133, at 471-72 (1974).
137. See J'AIre, 24 Cal. 3d at 804-05, 598 P.2d at 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
138. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc).
139. 27 Cal. 2d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (en banc).
140. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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can easily be characterized as foreseeable. 41 Social policy may not
justify shifting all such losses to negligent defendants. Yet under this
approach, judges would play a relatively minor role in making the
policy decision. Furthermore, consistency would be sacrificed be-
cause a different jury would decide each case.
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Products liability law has evolved in this century from a position
of virtual immunity for product manufacturers to the extensive strict
liability that exists today. The traditional rule-the doctrine of
Winterbottom v. Wright142 for many years limited a manufacturer's
liability for injuries caused by product defects to persons with whom
the manufacturer contracted.143 Since manufacturers seldom dealt
with accident victims, the privity requirement effectively protected
manufacturers from liability. A narrow exception to the privity rule
applied to products that were inherently dangerous. The landmark
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company1 44 virtually elimi-
nated the privity of contract requirement by characterizing any
product as inherently dangerous if the product were dangerous and
negligently manufactured. The case has been extensively followed, 14
and the effect has been to hold product manufacturers liable under
the normal rules of negligence.
The next step in the evolution of products law was the transfor-
mation of liability based on breach of implied warranty of
merchantability into strict liability in tort. The common law recog-
nized that a warranty of merchantability was implied in the sale of
goods. 148 This warranty was that the goods would be reasonably fit
141. See In re Kinsman Transit Co. v. Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
142. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. of Pleas 1842).
143. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 Am. L. RaG.
(53 U. PA. L. REV.) 209, 280-85, 289-310 (1905).
144. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see G. E. WMTE, supra note 18, at 120.
145. Mississippi was thought to be the only American jurisdiction that did not embrace
the MacPherson rule, see Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1100 (1960). While Mississippi has yet to expressly declare its agreement
with MacPherson, Mississippi courts have "jumped over it" to strict liability, see State Stove
Mfg. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966). Indeed, in a diversity case decided before
State Stove, a federal appeals court determined that a Mississippi court presented with the
question would be in agreement with MacPherson, see Mason v. American Emery Wheel
Works, 241 F.2d 906, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1957).
146. See Chesapeake & Virginia Coal Co. v. Rich Block Coal Co., 291 F. 1011 (4th
Cir. 1923); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117,
120 (1943).
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for the ordinary purposes for which they were used.14' The warranty
was later embodied in the Uniform Sales Act'48 and subsequently in
the Uniform Commercial Code.149 Breach of warranty was a matter
of strict liability,150 and it applied to personal injury and property
damage as well as pure pecuniary loss.151 However, accident victims
encountered difficulty because of the contractual defenses available
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. A form of
privity of contract was required; 52 the manufacturer was permitted
to disclaim the warranty;153 and prompt notice of breach of implied
warranty was required to be given by the accident victim to the
manufacturer.1 5
4
In a long series of cases involving personal injury or property
damage, common law courts began to disallow the contractual de-
fenses of lack of privity, disclaimer, and lack of notice.155 Gradually,
courts realized that since a contract was no longer required (privity
of contract not necessary) and contractual defenses of disclaimer and
lack of notice were not recognized, they were in reality imposing
strict liability in tort rather than in contract. 56 The Restatement ex-
plicitly recognized the tort nature of the recovery in section 402A.5 7
Many courts have adopted section 402A of the Restatement" as the
starting point for the imposition of strict liability in tort.
147. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931). See
Prosser, supra note 146, at 120-21.
148. 1 Uniform Sales Act (ULA) §§ 12-16 (1950).
149. Uniform Commercial Code (ULA) § 2-314(c).
150. See, e.g., Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 251-52
(Alaska 1969) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio
St. 244, 248-49, 147 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ohio 1958); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan.
68, 74-75, 269 P.2d 413, 418 (1954). See also Fleming, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. RaV.
192, 221-23 (1955).
151. See Prosser, supra note 145, at 1100-03; but cf. Seavey, Actions for Economic
Harm-A Comment, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1242 (1957).
152. See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 137"(Ala. 1976) (dicta);
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 695-96 (Mass. 1946) (dicta); Fleming, supra note
150, at 193-96.
153. See Prosser, supra note 146, at 157-67; Fleming, supra note 150, at 210-12.
154. See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 137 (Ala. 1976); Prosser,
supra note 146, at 163; Fleming, supra note 150, at 211.
155. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 50 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962) (en banc); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
156. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 50 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962) (en banc).
157. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 402A comment a.
158. See 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 4015, 4016 (May 1982) for a list of the 36
jurisdictions accepting the doctrine.
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The strict liability doctrine has evolved considerably since the
Restatement was promulgated in 1965. Two aspects of modern prod-
ucts liablity law will be discussed as they relate to the problems
under consideration in this article. These subjects are the definition
of defect and the requirement of causation of harm by the defect.
A. Defect
Strict liability as imposed by section 402A of the Restatement is
fairly conservative. The basis of liability is that the product be defec-
tive, and that the defect cause physical harm to person or prop-
erty.159 The scope of liability is thus much narrower than a scheme
whereby a manufacturer is strictly liable for all harm caused by its
products regardless of whether the product is defective. The require-
ment of defect is one of the main devices used to limit the scope of
potential liability in products cases. Courts have increased the scope
of liability since 1965 at least in part by modifying the definition of
defect. It is useful to look at some of these changes to see how the
increase in the scope of liability was accomplished.
Courts have recognized two main tests of defect, the "unreason-
ably dangerous" test and the "consumer expectations" test. Both
tests are embodied in the Restatement and utilized to some degree.
The consumer expectations test provides that a product is defective if
it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."160 The consumer ex-
pectations test in effect uses the market place to determine how
much safety must be built into a product. As long as the danger is
known and appreciated by consumers who use the product, there is
no liability. Liability is imposed only for hidden, unexpected, latent
dangers."1 The policy of the law was to let consumers decide the
degree of safety for which they were willing to pay. 62 If the product
was obviously dangerous, the manufacturer was not liable even
though it would have been technologically feasible for him to elimi-
nate or reduce the danger. 63 Liability was only imposed for latent,
unexpected dangers which resulted in injury to the user or consumer.
159. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 402A.
160. Id. at comment g.
161. See id. at comment i; Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions
or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 274 (1969).
162. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1558-59 (1973).
163. Id. at 1561.
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The unreasonably dangerous test of defect provides that a prod-
uct is defective if the danger posed by the product is unreasonable in
light of the product's utility.16  Dean Wade has stated165 that the
following factors should be considered in making this determination
of defectiveness:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole;
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury;
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe;
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility;
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product;
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowl-
edge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions;
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.166
This test calls for the subjective exercise of judgment in the applica-
tion of these factors. If the question of reasonableness of danger
were submitted to a jury, 6 7 it would be called upon not only to de-
termine questions of fact, such as the usefulness of the product and
the magnitude of the risk, but to exercise its subjective judgment in
evaluating the significance of these factors, i.e., concluding that the
risk is justified or unjustified.
The consumer expectations test provides very firm judicial con-
trol over juries in the process of imposing strict liability. A single
criterion is used for imposing liability, and it is so clear cut that it
can be applied with precision in a large majority of cases. In cases
where there was no dispute that the danger is known or obvious, the
164. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974) (en
banc).
165. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973).
166. Id. at 837-38.
167. Dean Wade discourages telling the jury of these factors and advocates that the use
of these criteria be limited to judges, students and commentators. Id. at 840.
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trial court would have a duty to take the issue away from the jury.
Appellate control of trial court decisions would also be a fairly sim-
ple matter because the question whether the danger is obvious is
usually clear, and the appellate courts can decide the issue just as
easily as the trial courts. 168 For these reasons the test is capable of
achieving a high degree of predictability and uniformity of result
within a given jurisdiction.
Many courts, however, have rejected the consumer expectations
test of defect because they perceive it to be so rigid that it yields
unjust results in a great many cases.1 69 The injustice appears espe-
cially compelling in cases where the dangerous aspect of the product
places at risk individuals who did make the economic choice to
purchase the product without a feasible safety device.17 0 Suppose a
homeowner purchases a lawnmower with an inadequate bladeguard
because it is cheaper than a mower with an adequate guard. While
he is using the mower, the blade hits a stone and throws it into a
bystander's face, causing serious injury. Using the consumer expec-
tations test to bar recovery by the bystander on the basis that the
purchaser was aware of the danger appears unfair because the acci-
dent victim lacked power to control the risk either by making a dif-
ferent purchasing decision or by exercising care in the use of the
mower.
In rejecting the consumer expectations test courts often impose
liability exclusively on the basis of the unreasonably dangerous test
of defect. They take the position that a product can be defective in
the sense that it presents an unreasonable risk of danger notwith-
standing that the danger is known or obvious.1  Obviousness of the
danger is merely one factor to be taken into account in determining
168. See, e.g., Brawner v. Liberty Indus., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. App. 1978) (gaso-
line can without child-proof cap not defective because danger is obvious).
169. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd mem., 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F.Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Luque
v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (en banc); Thompson v. Package
Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75
Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476
P.2d 713 (1970).
170. See, e.g., Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (plain-
tiff was an injured factory worker); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229,
85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (en banc) (plaintiffs were survivors of decedent-construction worker).
171. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd mem.,
474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 836, 454 P.2d 205,
208 (1969).
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reasonableness. 17 2 A punch press, for example, which is not equipped
with a safety device might be regarded as defective, notwithstanding
that the danger is known to the operator, if it presents a serious risk
and if the risk could have been greatly reduced by the installation of
an inexpensive safety device.
The unreasonably dangerous test, when used as the sole test of
defect, provides a degree of flexibility not available with the con-
sumer expectations test; at the same time, however, it also provides a
significantly lesser degree of judicial control than the consumer ex-
pectations test, and consequently sacrifices the degree to which uni-
formity and predictability of result can be achieved. The question of
reasonableness of a particular risk is often one upon which reasona-
ble people can disagree because a great many factors must be taken
into account, and those factors must be subjectively evaluated.'7 As
long as there is room for disagreement, the issue is properly submis-
sible to the jury. Inconsistent results in similar cases will necessarily
occur since each jury is composed of a different group of people. A
judge is permitted to direct verdicts under this test only if he feels
that no reasonable person could believe that the risk is unreasonable.
Under a general test of this sort verdicts are not likely to be directed
nearly as often as in cases where the legal standard leaves much less
room for the exercise of judgment.
Even in the rare situation where verdicts are directed, uniform-
ity of result within a given state is unlikely to be achieved. In deter-
mining whether a directed verdict is appropriate each judge will nec-
essarily have to develop his own criteria for determining
reasonableness.17' Since each judge will be applying his own criteria
it may be possible for each judge to act consistently with respect to
the cases he decides, but it will be more difficult for the ultimate
reviewing authority to successfully impose its views of how judgment
ought to be exercised on each trial judge. 5 Such a general test,
which requires the subjective evaluation of so many factors, can con-
sistently be applied within a jurisdiction only if the ultimate review-
ing authority is willing to exercise very close supervision over trial
courts.
172. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affid mem., 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Wade, supra note 165, at 837.
173. See Henderson, supra note 162, at 1557-58.
174. See Kecton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Tors, 75 HARM. L. REV. 463, 494-
98 (1962).
175. See Id. at 496.
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The unreasonably dangerous test of defect is particularly sus-
ceptible to unpredictable and even inconsistent results in cases in-
volving design defects. These are cases where there is no physical
flaw in the product that causes harm. Rather, the product is alleged
to be defective in that it was designed in such a way as to be unduly
dangerous. Plaintiffs in such cases will almost always be able to
point to a specific design change that would have prevented the spe-
cific accident in question. The difficulty is that any design change
may affect the product in many other ways as well, and a jury that is
focusing on prevention of a particular accident may not adequately
take this consideration into account.
Professor Henderson has characterized the question of reasona-
bleness of design as one involving polycentricity. 176 The ultimate de-
sign of a car, for example, must be made in view of many competing
considerations that cannot be dealt with in isolation. Suppose a pas-
senger in an automobile is injured by glass from a side window bro-
ken in a roll-over accident. A jury might find that the car was unrea-
sonably dangerous because the manufacturer failed to equip the side
windows with safety glass. Suppose further that in response to this
decision the manufacturer equipped future cars with safety glass in
all windows. In a subsequent accident a passenger in such a car is
severely burned because the car caught fire after an accident and
rescuers were unable to break through the safety glass and rescue
the passenger. Here the jury could find that the car was unreasona-
bly dangerous because the manufacturer installed safety glass in the
side windows since more persons are likely to be injured by being
trapped in burning cars than are likely to be injured by shattered
side window glass. The risk of inconsistent verdicts places the manu-
facturer in an awkward if not impossible position, and because virtu-
ally any design can be attacked in this manner the risk is present in
many cases.
Some courts have increased the scope of liability further by us-
ing "hindsight" rather than "foresight" in determining whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous in design cases and warning
cases. 17 This test differs from negligence in that fault is not re-
176. Henderson, supra note 162, at 1547, 1557-58. "[P]olycentric problems are many-
centered problems, in which each point for decision is related to all others as are the strands of
a spider web. If one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout
the entire web." Id. at 1536.
177. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (en
banc).
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quired. Knowledge of the risk is imputed to the manufacturer as of
the time of trial. Thus, a manufacturer could be held liable for mar-
keting a product that turned out to be dangerous even though the
risk was scientifically unknowable at the time that he produced the
product.178 Such a manufacturer would not be negligent because the
risk of harm was unforeseeable to him at the time of his conduct. 9
True strict liability is imposed by such courts.
Since the origin of strict liability, hindsight was always used to
determine whether a product possessing a physical flaw was unrea-
sonably dangerous.180 Yet the Restatement expressly required that
foresight be used in warning cases,181 and although the comments
are somewhat ambiguous on the point, it impliedly used foresight in
determining whether a product was defective in design.18 2 Some
courts have followed this distinction and in essence require negli-
gence in design and warning cases.18 3 More recently a number of
courts have stated that hindsight was to be used in both design and
warning cases as well as in cases involving manufacturing flaws.1 '
The use of hindsight increases the scope of liability in cases
178. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982).
179. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974)
(en banc).
180. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 402A(2)(a); Hollenshead, Historical Per-
spective on Product Liability Reform, 1 J. PROD. L. 75, 81 (1982); Wade, Strict Tort Liabil-
Ity of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-16 (1965).
181. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 402A comment j.
182. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 402A comment k, which exempts from strict
liability products creating risks that cannot be eliminated "in the present state of human
knowledge" if marketing the product is justifiable because of its apparent utility. There is no
liability for marketing such products as long as a proper warning is given. Id. Since a warning
must be given only with respect to hazards which a manufacturer knew or could have known
about, Id. at comment j, it follows that there can be no liability for marketing apparently
useful products containing unknown dangers arising from the products' design.
183. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co. , 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska law)
(noted In 56 NED. L. REv. 422 (1977)); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155
(8th Cir. 1975) (Minnesota law); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121 (9th Cir. 1968); Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1971); Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); Cunningham v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 502 S.W.2d
66 (Ky. App. 1973) (discussed In Comment, Products Liability: Is Section 402A Strict Lia-
bility Really Strict in Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L. J. 866 (1974)); see also Twerski, From Defect to
Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 297, 317 (1977); Comment, The Diminishing Role of Negligence in Manufacturers'
Liability for Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 102 (1977).
184. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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where there is a change in knowledge or a change in technology be-
tween the time of manufacture and the time of trial. Where no such
change occurs the foresight standard and the hindsight standard
yield the same result 85 since under the law of negligence a manufac-
turer is held to the knowledge of an expert and is required to keep
up with technological advances.186 In such cases knowledge of the
latest technology is imputed to manufacturers whether they are actu-
ally aware of the technology or not. The difference between hind-
sight and foresight, therefore, is significant only in the rather infre-
quent cases where there has been a change in scientific knowledge of
a given risk or technological ability to reduce or eliminate a known
risk between the time of manufacture and the time of trial.
While this development, like the move away from the consumer
expectations test, increased the scope of liability, it did so without
decreasing jury control. The basic determination to be made by the
jury is essentially the same under either test, i.e., reasonableness of
the risk. The only difference is that in a negligence case the jury
must resolve an additional question of fact, i.e., foreseeability of risk.
Whether the increase in the scope of liability represents good public
policy is a difficult question which need not be addressed here, but at
least it is a policy decision which was consciously made and which
can uniformly be implemented within the jurisdiction adopting this
approach.
In Cronin v. J. B. Olson, Corp.187 the California Supreme Court
reduced judicial guidance in the determination of defectiveness to a
minimum. The court rejected the unreasonably dangerous test of de-
fect, feeling that its close resemblance to negligence created an ap-
parent inconsistency with the concept of strict liability. The court
substituted no new test of defect for use by lower courts and juries.
This apparently left the state without a test for determining defec-
tiveness in design cases since earlier California cases had already re-
jected the consumer expectations test.' 88
One solution to this dilemma might be to tell juries in design
cases that they must decide whether the product was defective with-
out defining "defect." This solution has a serious flaw, however; the
185. Interagency Task Force on Products Liability, Final Report 11-8-9 (Nov. 1, 1977).
186. See Guffie v. Erie Strayer Co., 350 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1965); Ross v. Philip Morris
& Co. 328 F.2d 3, 13 n.13 (8th Cir. 1964); Marsh Wood Prods. Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
187. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (en banc).
188. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 973 1982-1983
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
term "defect" has a common sense meaning in cases where a physi-
cal flaw is present in the product, but it has no independent signifi-
cance in cases where appropriateness of design or warning is in ques-
tion. This method would leave juries completely on their own to
determine defectiveness in design cases on a case-by-case basis.
In any event, Cronin meant that the state of California had for
a time no uniform policy for determining when to impose strict lia-
bility on product sellers since determination of defectiveness is the
primary criterion for deciding whether to impose strict liability. If
such important social policy questions as whether to impose strict
liability or fault-based liability ought to be consciously decided by
responsible officials (either the legislature or common law courts)
and uniformly implemented within the jurisdiction, Cronin repre-
sents the wrong approach.
Recently, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,189 the California
court retreated from its position in Cronin by adopting a specific test
for determining defectiveness in design cases. The court combined
the two traditional tests of defect (consumer expectations test and
unreasonably dangerous test) in the disjunctive. Thus, in California,
a product is defective in design either if it contains a hidden or un-
known danger, or if the danger is unreasonable in hindsight.190 The
court refers to the latter test as the "risk-benefit" test 91 because it
regards the "unreasonably dangerous" formulation to be mislead-
ing,19 2 but the test is clearly the same.193 The product is defective "if
through hindsight the jury determines that the product's design em-
bodies 'excessive preventable danger,' or, in other words, if the jury
finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design out-
weighs the benefits of such design."194 In design defect cases in Cali-
fornia, the jury may be advised as follows:
[A] product is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably fore-
189. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
190. Id. at 429-32, 573 P.2d at 454-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
191. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
192. See id. at 424-26, 573 P.2d at 450-51, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 232-34.
193. See Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The relevant factors to be
considered include the gravity of the danger, the likelihood of the danger, the feasibility of a
safer alternative design, the cost of the improved design, and the adverse consequences of the
alternative design. Id. These factors are essentially the same as in the "unreasonably danger-
ous" test.
194. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (citations omitted).
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seeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's de-
sign proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove,
in light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on balance the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design. 195
By adopting this test, California increased the scope of liability
from the pre-Cronin "unreasonably dangerous" standard in two
ways. First, combining the tests in the disjunctive increases the scope
of liability. This is because there are some products which are defec-
tive under one test but not the other, and the test is broad enough to
deem a product defective if it violates either test. For example, if a
new drug contains an unknown danger which is reasonable in retro-
spect, the product would be defective because it violates consumer
expectations notwithstanding that the drug is not* unreasonably dan-
gerous. On the other hand, if the product contains an obvious danger
which is unreasonable in retrospect, such as a lawnmower without a
blade guard, it would be defective because it violates the unreasona-
bly dangerous test. In California, a product is nondefective in design
only if the danger is both known and reasonable in retrospect.
As the Barker court noted, its approach differs from the Re-
statement in that the latter "treats such consumer expectations as a
'ceiling' on a manufacturer's responsibility under strict liability prin-
ciples, rather than as a 'floor.' """ That is, the most a manufacturer
had to do under the Restatement was to make the dangers of his
product known to consumers. But even in the case of products con-
taining hidden dangers he could escape strict liability by showing
that the product was "unavoidably unsafe.' 9 7 There was never lia-
bility if the danger was obvious or known, but even if the danger was
hidden the manufacturer could sometimes escape liability. Under
Barker, "at a minimum a product must meet ordinary consumer ex-
pectations as to safety to avoid being found defective."' 98 However,
even a product with known dangers is defective if those dangers are
not reasonable in retrospect. The California courts thus increased the
scope of a product manufacturer's potential liability by holding him
liable if the product is defective under either test.
The second way that the Barker court significantly increased
the scope of liability over pre-Cronin products law was by placing
195. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
196. Id. at 426 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7.
197. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 402A comment k.
198. 20 Cal. 3d at 426 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7.
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the burden of proving reasonableness of design on the defendant.' 99
A plaintiff can raise the issue of defectiveness under the second
prong of the Barker test-unreasonably dangerous in hindsight-by
merely showing that "the product's design proximately caused his
injury. '20° The defendant can then exonerate himself only by show-
ing, "in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of
the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inheren in such
design." 20 1 For example, in Campbell v. General Motors Corp.,202
the plaintiff bus passenger fell while standing in a bus that lurched
unexpectedly. She claimed that the absence of a handle on a nearby
wall was the design feature of the bus that caused her injury. She
argued that if there had been such a handle she might have been
able to grab it and use it to avert her fall. The court held that with
this testimony she made a submissible case. The burden then shifted
to the defendant to prove that the design of the bus without the han-
dle was reasonable in light of the risks, benefits, and costs
involved. °
The first method the Barker court chose to expand liabil-
ity-adopting the disjunctive two-prong test of defect-is an appro-
priate one; it accomplishes the desired expansion without a signifi-
cant loss of jury control over that which existed under the
"unreasonably dangerous" test standing alone. The second method,
however-shifting the burden to defendant-potentially increases
the scope of liability because of a significant loss of jury control.
True, if juries really follow the Barker instructions, only a small in-
crease in the number of plaintiff's verdicts will result; these will be in
the few cases where the evidence concerning reasonableness of de-
sign is evenly balanced. Defendants will lose such cases since they
now bear the risk of nonpersuasion. If one agrees, however, that ju-
ries are often plaintiff-oriented and occasionally disregard the
judge's instructions in order to find for the plaintiff, the risk of incor-
rect verdicts based on jury bias will be greatly increased by shifting
the burden to the defendant.
This is because additional cases will be submissible- cases pre-
viously withheld from juries because of insufficient evidence of de-
fect-thus increasing the opportunity for such jury misconduct. This
199. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
202. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
203. Id. at 125, 649 P.2d at 232, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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risk of jury misconduct is minimized in jurisdictions where the bur-
den is on the plaintiff; to prevail in such jurisdictions, the plaintiff
must present sufficient evidence so that reasonable people could be-
lieve that the design was unreasonable. For example, at a minimum
he might be required to present evidence sufficient for a jury to be-
lieve that an alternative design which would have prevented the
harm was economically and technologically feasible.204 Where the
design issue is sufficiently technical that the jury could not base its
conclusion on common knowledge, technical evidence of feasibility of
an alternative design is required °.2 5 Absent such a showing, the
plaintiff has not made out a submissible case, and the trial judge
would direct a verdict.20 Consequently, the jury would not have a
chance to decide such a case. Under the Barker formulation, how-
ever, such a case would go to the jury merely upon a showing that
some design feature of the product caused plaintiff's harm. The jury
would then have an opportunity to decide the case in favor of the
plaintiff in disregard of the court's instructions even though it be-
lieved the defendant's evidence that the design was reasonable be-
cause the utility outweighed the risk.
Thus the second Barker approach gives juries maximum reign
to disregard the court's instructions and implement its own notions
of justice and social policy because it eliminates a screening mecha-
nism which keeps many unmeritorious claims away from the jury.
Some totally frivolous cases can still be kept from the jury because
in extraordinary cases the judge is permitted to take a case away
from the jury by directing a verdict in favor of the party with the
burden of proof.20 7 Such directed verdicts will probably be rare be-
cause even in cases where all the evidence concerning reasonableness
of design comes from the defendant, and is to the effect that the
design is reasonable, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict if the jury
disbelieves all of the defendant's evidence. A case is submissible in
order to give the jury the opportunity to disbelieve the defendant's
evidence.
It is true that even in jurisdictions where a plaintiff must make
204. See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1977) (en banc).
The court required that the plaintiff provide a practical and technically feasible alternative to
show that the present design was defective. Id. at 67, 577 P.2d at 1327.
205. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327.
206. See id.
207. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2535
(1971).
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a prima facie showing of defect in order to get to the jury there is
always the possibility that the jury will disregard the court's instruc-
tions and find for the plaintiff even though it does not believe that
the product is defective. While this thwarts the state's social policy,
the harm done by the faulty decision in such a case is ameliorated,
to some degree at least, in the sense that a different jury could have
decided the case the same way for a proper reason, i.e., it could have
found the product defective. A greater departure from social policy
occurs when the jury imposes strict liability under circumstances
where no reasonable person could believe that the product was defec-
tive under the risk-utility test.
B. Causation
Another important basis for restricting the scope of potential
liability in products liability cases is the requirement that the plain-
tiff prove that the defendant's defective product caused the plaintiff's
harm. Several courts have expanded the scope of liability either by
relaxing the plaintiff's burden of proof on this issue, or shifting the
burden to the defendant, or both. So far, these courts have relaxed
these rules only in some fairly specific situations, and consequently
their impact is limited. However, the approach is well worth analyz-
ing because it could be applied very generally in all tort cases. There
is already considerable scholarly sentiment in favor of such expan-
sion,2 0 8 and if this occurs, tort law would change dramatically be-
cause the causation requirement would no longer restrict the scope of
potential liability.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories2 9 is the leading case in this
trend toward relaxation of the causation requirement. The case in-
volved the problem of harm caused to the female offspring of preg-
nant women who took diethylstilbestrol ("DES") to prevent miscar-
riage. Quite often the "DES daughter" discovers that she has one of
several disorders caused by the DES years after the drug was con-
208. Delgado, Beyond SindelL Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law
of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. 1. REV. 1399 (1980); Robinson, Multiple Causa-
tion In Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982). See also King,
Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions
and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1396 (1981); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of
Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797, 828-29 (1977).
209. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
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sumed by her mother.210 In such cases it is often impossible for the
victim to identify the manufacturer or distributor of the DES that
was consumed by her mother because of the lapse of time, the lack
of adequate records, and the large number of manufacturers and dis-
tributors of DES.211 Such a person would fail to recover under the
traditional rules of negligence or strict liability because she could not
prove that the defendant sold the drug that caused her disorder.
The California court in Sindell rectified this problem by creat-
ing a new theory of recovery called "market share liability," which
dispenses with the need to identify the source of the drug.212 Under
this theory, the plaintiff is required to join a sufficient number of
manufacturers so that a "substantial share" of the DES market is
represented.2 13 Damages are then apportioned among defendants ac-
cording to each defendant's relative share of the DES market.21"4
Any defendant able to prove that it could not have.supplied the drug
that caused the plaintiff's harm is exonerated.2 5
The policy underlying the decision to implement market share
liability is that as between an innocent victim and a negligent manu-
facturer, fairness requires that the manufacturer bear the cost of the
injury. 6 The court reasoned that the theory was fair to manufactur-
ers even though a given plaintiff was not required to establish which
defendant caused her harm because each defendant will ultimately
be held liable only for approximately the amount of harm it actually
caused.21 The idea is that if a given defendant manufactured 10% of
the DES used for the prevention of miscarriage, he probably caused
10% of the harm caused by the use of DES for that purpose. If all
plaintiffs had full information, 10% of them would elect to sue this
manufacturer because he was the source of the drug consumed by
their mothers, and this manufacturer would end up satisfying the
judgments in these cases. It is thus fair, according to this theory, to
hold this defendant liable for 10% of the judments in all cases since
this is equal to the amount that he would pay if plaintiffs had perfect
information. In another forum the author criticized the ability of the
210. Henderson, Products Liability, 3 CORP. L. REv. 143, 144 (1980).
211. Note, Industry-Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of the Missing Manufacturer
in Products Liability Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139, 141 (1981).
212. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
213. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
217. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
19831
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 979 1982-1983
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
theory to achieve its objective with fairness to defendants.21 The
critical issue here is the effect of the theory on the court's ability to
uniformly implement policy decisions.
In Sindell the court relaxed the traditional burden of proof with
respect to causation of harm in two ways. First, it shifted the burden
of proving the source of the drug to the manufacturer. A defendant
can escape liability only by proving that it could not have been the
source of the drug.219 Without such evidence the defendant becomes
liable for the proportional amount of the judgment equivalent to its
share of the market.220
The second relaxation of the burden of proof relates to proof of
market share. The court recognized that it was impossible to prove
market share with mathematical exactitude221 because of such fac-
tors as lapse of time, absence of adequate records, and the multiple
uses to which the drug was put.2 22 The court concluded that if be-
cause of such circumstances the jury cannot make a correct determi-
nation it "may make it the best it can." 223 The quoted language was
taken from Summers v. Tice,224 an analogous California case upon
which Sindell heavily relied in formulating the market share theory.
Summers explained the meaning of the quoted language, stating
that the jury's decision is "more or less a guess. 225 The relaxation of
the burden of proof with respect to market share is not total since
the plaintiff is required to introduce some evidence of market share,
but it is clear from this language that the traditional standard of
proof need not be met.
Both methods of changing the traditional burden of proof re-
quirement have serious implications with respect to increasing the
scope of potential liability. Shifting the burden of proof on the ques-
tion of identity of the manufacturer increases the scope of potential
liability in several ways. First, because there is no evidence of causa-
tion in a great many cases, the party with the burden of proof will
lose all such cases by default. Under the traditional rule the plaintiff
218. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623 (1981).
219. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
223. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
224. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948).
225. Id.
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will lose such cases because she has the burden of proving causation
as an essential element. of her case. Under Sindell, however, defen-
dants will lose all such cases because they have no evidence available
to prove absence of causation. The impact of a shift in the burden of
proof is considerably different here compared to the impact of the
shift in Barker v. LuI 2 6 which dealt with the issue of reasonableness
of design.227 Ample evidence will always be available on that issue,
and a shift in the burden of proof should in theory cause defendants
to lose relatively few additional cases-those where the jury finds the
evidence to be evenly balanced.
This result of Sindell inexorably flows from the logic of a rule
adopted specifically to implement the policy of shifting such losses to
defendants. Assuming that the policy decision is wise, this conse-
quence of the rule cannot be faulted because it does uniformly im-
plement a policy decision deliberately made by an appropriate body.
All DES cases within the state, where there is no evidence of the
manufacturer's identity, will be resolved in the same way, i.e., the
manufacturers involved in the case will lose.
The second way the shift in the burden of proof increases the
potential scope of liability is by creating a loss of jury control. This
loss of jury control is the same as in the case of shifting the burden
of proof on the question of defect. There is no screening device to
protect against an adverse jury decision even when the evidence is
clear that the defendant did not supply the drug. The jury is free to
disregard the court's instructions even in frivolous cases.
However, unlike the design cases, it is not clear that this sort of
jury misconduct will thwart the policy underlying Sindell. The basic
policy of Sindell is risk-spreading in order to relieve plaintiffs of cat-
astrophic losses and to provide manufacturers with an incentive to
improve the safety of their products.22 8 These objectives can be
achieved by imposing liability on any DES manufacturer without re-
gard to whether he supplied the drug consumed by the plaintiff's
mother. A jury verdict holding a manufacturer who did not supply
the drug liable is consistent with the risk-spreading policy.22 9 Sindell
226. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 189-207.
228. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
229. See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 643, 659-60 (1978); Klemne, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COL. L.
REV. 153, 163-65 (1976).
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was also based on an unarticulated countervailing policy, i.e., pro-
tecting manufacturers from such potential excessive liability that
they become unwilling to provide society with desirable and useful
products because they are potentially harmful. The court attempted
to implement this policy by apportioning liability in accordance with
market share. Permitting defendants to escape liability in selected
cases because of the fortuitous presence of exculpatory evidence dis-
torts this apportionment scheme and defeats the underlying policy of
protecting manufacturers because some manufacturers will be held
liable for more than their market share.3 Under this line of reason-
ing, the loss of jury control which might lead to jury misconduct in
disregarding a defendant's exculpatory evidence, furthers the policy
underlying Sindell.
The second way in which Sindell relaxed the plaintiffs tradi-
tional burden of proof-permitting the jury to decide each defen-
dant's market share on the basis of otherwise inadequate evi-
dence-can impede the policy underlying Sindell by seriously
distorting the damage apportionment scheme. The obvious reason for
restricting each defendant's liability to his approximate market share
is to prevent defendants from being subject to such excessive liability
that he and others like him will be deterred from marketing useful
products in the future. The prospect of being held liable for signifi-
cantly more harm than a given defendant actually caused creates a
real likelihood of such excessive deterrence, and the relaxed burden
of proof--coupled with other features of market share liabil-
ity-create just this possibility.
Serious distortion will inevitably result from a number of fac-
tors. In many cases there is a lack of sufficient evidence to determine
the market share of a given defendant with anything approaching
23122precision. 1 Since the jury is permitted to "do the best it can ' 232
even if the evidence is inadequate, it is quite conceivable that a jury
could make a significant mistake in many cases. For example, in a
case where the evidence of market share is sparse, a jury doing the
best it can might well find that a given defendant's market share is
30% when in fact it was only 20%. In such a case, if the plaintiffs
damages were $1,000,000 and if each defendant was liable for his
230. Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
HARV. L. REV. 668, 675-76 (1981).
231. R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 159 (1980).
232. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 11:937
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 982 1982-1983
EXPANDING TORT RECOVERY
pro rata share of the judgment, then the defendant's true share of
the judgment would be $200,000; but because of the jury error the
defendant's share would be increased by 50% to $300,000.
This distortion would be further magnified by another feature of
the theory. Sindell apparently requires defendants to pay 100% of
the plaintiff's judgment even though the plaintiff has not joined
100% of the producers of DES which might have supplied the of-
fending drug to the plaintiff's mother.2 33 The plaintiff is merely re-
quired to join a sufficient number of producers so that a "substantial
share" of the producers of DES are joined. 34 The court has not de-
fined just what a "substantial share" is, but assume for purposes of
the hypothetical that the plaintiff has joined manufacturers repre-
senting 60% of the market and that this satisfies the substantial
share requirement. Under these circumstances a defendant whose
true share of the market is 20% would be liable for one-third of the
judgment, or $333,333.33, because his market share represents one-
third of the share of the market represented by the joined defen-
dants. However, if the jury errs and finds that defendant represents
30% of the relevant market, the defendant would be liable for one-
half of the plaintiff's judgment, or $500,000, because his market
share is 50% of the total share of the market represented by all of
the defendants joined in the suit. The combination of the jury error
and the requirement that defendants pay all of the judgment even
though less than all possible suppliers of the drug have been joined
results in a distortion of a defendant's liability by 250%, i.e., defen-
dant pays $500,000 of the judgment even though his true pro rata
share is $200,000.
Other courts have resolved the DES problem by permitting
plaintiffs to recover under a theory that creates even greater distor-
tion than the market share theory. 35 These courts have modified the
concert of action theory to permit recovery in DES cases even
though the traditional elements of concert of action are not met.2 36
233. See id. at 612-13, 617, 607 P.2d at 937, 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 148; Note,
Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH. U.L.
REV. 551, 574 (1981); Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L.
REV. 695, 721 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability-The California Roulette of Causation
Eliminating the Identification Requirement, 11 SETON HAL, L. REV. 610, 621 (1981).
234. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
235. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), afd, 55
N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). For a good discussion of the Bichler
decision, see Comment, 62 B.U.L. REV. 633 (1982).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 237-42.
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For example, in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.23 7 the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court approved a modification of the con-
cert of action theory to permit recovery in DES cases where plain-
tiffs would be expected to have difficulty identifying which of numer-
ous manufacturers produced the product that caused the harm. The
court held that each manufacturer that committed the wrongful act
of negligently selling DES for purposes of preventing miscarriage
would be held liable for the acts of other such manufacturers if the
defendant's conduct had the effect of substantially encouraging or
assisting the wrongful conduct of the other manufacturers a.2 3  This
represents a significant departure from the traditional concept of lia-
bility for aiding and abetting. Traditionally, an aider and abettor
was required to intend to lend encouragement or assistance to the
wrongdoer. 39 Bichler apparently requires no such intent, and fur-
thermore does not require that the defendant foresee an unreasona-
ble risk that his conduct will encourage similar misconduct by other
manufacturers.24 0 A negligent manufacturer is liable for the acts of
another if his conduct merely substantially encourages the other's
misconduct.
Bichler was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals on
fairly narrow procedural grounds;2 41 however, the court in dicta indi-
cated its approval of the lower courts' expansion of products liability
law in order to meet the exigencies of the case. The court said "prod-
ucts liability law cannot be expected to stand still where innocent
victims face 'inordinately difficult problems of proof.' "242 While this
view is certainly commendable in theory, the Bichler solution to the
237. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), affd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182,
450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
238. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
239. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603-06, 607 P.2d 924, 931-33,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139-41, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 at 292 (4th ed. 1971); Birnbaum, DES Concert of Action Theory:
New Cases Bring Confusion, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 4, 1981, at 31; Henderson,
Products Liability-DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches Shore, 3 CORP. L. Rv.
143, 145-46 (1980); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413, 429-30
(1937).
240. See Henderson, supra note 239, at 145-46.
241. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 583-84, 436 N.E.2d 182, 187-88, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776, 781-82 (1982). The court did not decide the merits of Lilly's objections to the
jury charge on the issue of concerted action since it found that the objections had not been
appropriately preserved for review. Accordingly, the court only assessed the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to determine if it supported the jury's finding of concerted action.
242. Id. at 379-80, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (quoting Caprara v.
Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981)).
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problem in practice ends up distorting liability even more than the
Sindell approach because any negligent producer would be liable for
100% of any given plaintiff's damages under a concert of action
theory.243
A major problem with Bichler is that the rule it adopted is not
sufficiently restricted. Bichler revised the concert of action theory
specifically so that DES daughters could avoid particularly difficult
proof problems. The theory, however, appears sufficiently broad to
apply to future cases where no such proof problems exist. For exam-
ple, if many pedestrians in a town jaywalk in violation of the law,
the conduct of each of them probably encourages the others. Under
the Bichler theory each pedestrian might be liable for all accidents
resulting from jaywalking in the town even though none of them in-
tends to encourage the others. Even if this result is desirable it can-
not be justified for the reasons articulated in Bichler (particularly
difficult proof problems) and the result should not be an accidental
by-product of that decision.
To a lesser degree the same criticism is true of Sindell; how-
ever, market share liability is clearly much more restricted than it
might have been. It apparently only applies to fungible goods, and it
may be limited to negligence actions rather than strict liability.
244
Furthermore, it restricts its probabilistic approach to determining
causation to the question of identity of the manufacturer. Another
causation question in DES cases, to which Sindell apparently does
not apply, is whether DES caused the plaintiff's condition. Tradition-
ally, a plaintiff must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence.
At a minimum this requires evidence of a 51% probability, i.e., that
the drug was more likely than not the cause of the disease.24 5 In a
case where plaintiff can only show a 20% chance that DES caused
the harm, she would fail. It is possible to apply a probabilistic theory
here and hold DES manufacturers liable for 20% of a plaintiff's
harm, but Sindell did not extend the theory this far.
Yet the theory may still be broader than necessary to accom-
plish its objectives. The rationale of Sindell is to spread the risk and
243. The liability imposed by the concert of action theory is joint and several. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 239, at 292; RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 876. While the court did
not directly consider the merits of the concert of action theory, it did indicate approval of it.
See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
244. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
245. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 433B, comment a.
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provide manufacturers of fungible goods with an incentive to im-
prove the safety of their products.246 A countervailing policy is to
keep the scope of potential liability within reasonable bounds so that
such manufacturers will be willing to continue to produce useful
products even though there is a risk that they will turn out to be
harmful. In view of the enormous potential damage in the DES cases
and in view of the substantial chance that certain manufacturers will
be held liable out of proportion to their actual market share, it is
quite possible that the theory will adversely affect the willingness of
businesses to provide useful fungible goods.
It is possible to apply the theory more selectively so as to reduce
the risk of this undesirable consequence. The DES cases can be bro-
ken down into two categories. A relatively small number of cases
involve adenocarcinoma, a very serious form of cancer.247 The dam-
ages in such cases are catastrophic from the victim's point of view.
The other category of cases involve conditions such as vaginal ade-
nosis, a minor physical condition which may turn out to be harm-
less.248 In cases where cancer or other specific harm does not de-
velop, the damages resulting from this condition are likely to be
largely intangible, such as mental distress resulting from fear of can-
cer. If it is not feasible to spread all the losses caused by DES be-
cause of the reasons discussed above, it may be an appropriate com-
promise for a court to limit the market share theory to cases
involving specific serious harm. In the cancer cases, for example,
risk-spreading is very desirable because the losses are too high to be
246. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
247. Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, Epidemiologic aspects and factors related
to survival in 384 Registry cases of clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and cervix, 135
AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 876 (1979); see also Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enter-
prise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964 (1978). A worldwide registry indicates that 384
women born between 1940 and 1971 contracted adenocarcinoma; 213 of these cases were asso-
ciated with the use of DES. Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, supra, at 877.
248. Weitzner & Hirsch, Diethylstibestrol-Medicolegal Chronology, 1982 MED.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE Q. 145, 148. Vaginal adenosis is a disorder that results from the growth of
mucinous products in the vagina. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 231, at 158 (1980); Note, Be-
yond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV. 695, 696 n.12 (1981);
Interview with Dr. A.L. Herbst, reprinted in 30 CA-A-CANCER J. FOR CLINICIAN S 326 (1980)
[hereinafter Interview]. This appears as normal tissue which has developed in an abnormal
location. Interview, supra, at 329. While this growth was once suspected of being pre-
cancerous, recent studies indicate otherwise. See R. EPSTEIN, supra, at 158; Weitzner &
Hirsch, supra, at 157. Note, supra, at 696 n.12; Interview, supra, at 329. However, recent
studies indicate that some "DES daughters" may experience increased reproductive difficul-
ties. Weitzner & Hirsch, supra, at 148-54. This risk may be enhanced in the case of women
with adenosis. Id. at 154.
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born by the average person. Yet because the number of cancer cases
is rather small, manufacturers may well be able to bear these losses
without serious adverse consequences.
The need for risk-spreading in the adenosis cases is much less.
These victims are better able to bear the harm they suffer than the
cancer victims because the total harm suffered by a given individual
is less and because the harm is largely intangible, as opposed to the
out of pocket losses such as medical expenses and lost wages fre-
quently incurred by the cancer victims. The feasibility of spreading
these losses is much less than in the cancer cases because the total
cost of all such damages will probably be extremely high in view of
the number of potential plaintiffs in this category and because of the
litigation expenses associated with the trial of so many cases.249 By
limiting market share liability to the cancer cases, the practical con-
sequences of the inability of the theory to apportion damages appro-
priately would be greatly mitigated, yet the risk-spreading policy
would be implemented in the cases where it is most needed.
The Sindell approach to causation can be expanded beyond
DES cases and applied to all cases of multiple causation where it is
not clear which of several tortfeasors caused the harm. This could be
done where the conduct of the potential tortfeasors was different and
where the conduct occurred at different times. That is, each
tortfeasor could be held liable on the basis of the probability that his
conduct caused the harm. This approach to resolving causation ques-
tions is becoming increasingly popular with legal scholars.250
One author has suggested an example that clearly illustrates the
nature of the problem and how the theory might work.25 Suppose a
cancer victim can establish that exposure to asbestos created a 6%
risk of causing his cancer, exposure to hazardous wastes created a
2% risk, and exposure to a certain medication accounted for an addi-
tional 2% risk. Environmental conditions accounted for the other
90% of the risk. Under the traditional rule none of the defendants
would be liable because none created a 51% risk of causing the vic-
tim's cancer, the percentage necessary to meet the more probable
249. Between one-half million and three million DES users exposed their offspring to the
drug during pregnancy. Note, supra note 247, at 965, & n.6. Potential total damages are
estimated in the billions of dollars, see Note, A Remedy for the "DES Daughters". Products
Liability Without the Identification Requirement, 42 U. PiTr. L. REv. 669, 691 (1981); Note,
supra note 247, at 968, & n.21. See also Henderson, supra note 210, at 143.
250. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 208, at 736-49; Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 208.
See also King, supra note 208, at 1376-88; Twerski, supra note 208, at 819-29.
251. Robinson, supra note 208, at 762.
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than not test. In such a case, however, a court using a probabilistic
approach could impose complete liability on each of the three manu-
facturers, but only for the amount of harm that each potentially
caused under the probabilistic theory. That is, the asbestos manufac-
turer would be liable for 6% of plaintiff's damages, and the other two
manufacturers would be each liable for 2% of the damages. 252
Advocates defend this approach as a more precise method of
apportioning liability than the traditional all or nothing rule. 53 In a
case where the plaintiff can prove that the defendant created a 51%
risk of causing his harm, the common law holds that defendant liable
for 100% of the damages, and in cases where a defendant creates a
49% risk of causing the harm, the common law rule exonerates the
defendant entirely. This is very crude because the defendant is held
liable for a disproportionately large share of the damages in the for-
mer case and a disproportionately small share of the damages in the
latter case.254 A probabilistic theory of determining causation holds
the defendant liable for the correct amount of the harm caused in all
cases.
2 55
While this argument sounds plausible, it is not clear that the
results it reaches are theoretically desirable. In a fascinating article,
Professor Kaye concluded that in most cases the traditional, rule
yields more desirable results. 256 His work is based in part on the the-
sis that it is just as undesirable to pay an undeserving plaintiff too
much as it is to pay a deserving plaintiff too little. 57 The probabilis-
tic theory yields incorrect results in every case because each defen-
dant will pay every plaintiff the wrong amount-he pays too little to
those plaintiffs whose harm he caused and too much to those plain-
tiffs whose harm he did not cause. 58 Of course the traditional rule
yields some incorrect results as well, but Professor Kaye has demon-
strated mathematically that the magnitude of damages produced by
the wrong decisions is greater under the probabilistic theory than
under the traditional rule.259
252. See Id. at 750-53, 761-64.
253. See, e.g., King, supra note 208, at 1381-87; Robinson, supra note 208, at 751.
254. See Robinson, supra note 208, at 751-52.
255. See Id. at 757.
256. Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Na-
ked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 A.B.A. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 487,
502-03, 513-16.
257. See Id. at 488-91, 516.
258. See Id. at 501-02.
259. Id. at 496-503.
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Regardless of whether the probabilistic theory yields theoreti-
cally correct results or not, it certainly raises several practical
problems. Foremost among these is the extreme difficulty of deter-
mining the risk associated with each potential defendant's activity.
There is no body of science that resolves such questions with preci-
sion. A precisely individualized determination would have to be
made in each case in order to estimate probability accurately. All
persons are subject to a multitude of carcinogenic environmental fac-
tors in widely varying degrees and amounts. Furthermore, the ge-
netic makeup of each individual must be considered.260 The jury
could not possibly decide such questions without the aid of experts,
and their testimony would obviously be based on judgment to a large
degree. One can imagine a "battle of the experts" in such cases
where the plaintiffs and the defendant's respective experts are miles
apart and the jury has no basis for deciding between the two ex-
tremes. The jury would be forced to decide such cases "the best it
can," and this is likely to yield a very crude approximation of the
risk created by each defendant. Any error of this sort will distort the
apportionment scheme, e.g., finding a 3% risk when defendant cre-
ated only a 2% risk will result in defendant paying one-third more
than he ought.
A counter-argument is that a rough approximation of the
probability of harm is sufficient because if mistakes are made in all
cases, the chances are that they will even out in the long run, i.e.,
sometimes the estimate of risk created by a given manufacturer will
be too high but at other times it will be too low. This is true only if
juries are plaintiff-defendant neutral, i.e., make just as many mis-
takes in favor of defendants as in favor of plaintiffs. If the majority
of juries are plaintiff-oriented-as many people believe-then it
seems likely that more of the mistakes will favor plaintiffs. This
seems especially likely in cases where less than 100% of the causes of
the plaintiffs harm are represented in the suit because the jury de-
termination does more than just apportion damages among defen-
dants, it apportions damages between the plaintiff and defendants.
An under-estimation of a given defendant's liability in such a case
will result in a diminished recovery for the plaintiff.
Beyond this, the characterization problems presented by this ap-
proach are so vast that it is unlikely that any two cases would be
treated alike. This would defeat the purpose of the theory because
260. See Note, supra note 248, at 713-14.
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uniformity of result can be achieved only if all similar cases are
treated the same.
The initial problem requires a determination whether the case
involves multiple causation and is thus appropriate for application of
the theory. Assume a car is defectively designed in that an exces-
sively rigid knob protruding from the dashboard creates an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to a passenger in a collision. The risk is that if
the passenger is not wearing a seat belt he may be thrown against
the protrusion. In a great many second collision cases involving this
model car we will know only that the passenger was injured because
he came into contact with something in the interior of the car, but
we will be unable to tell whether the protrusion in question was in-
volved. Suppose expert testimony establishes that the protrusion is
probably involved in 10% of these second collision cases. We could
treat each such case as a multiple causation case and hold the manu-
facturer liable for 10% of the damages. However, other cases will
arise where we can show conclusively that the protrusion was in-
volved-perhaps an indentation in plaintiff's skull matches the shape
of the protrusion exactly. Here there would be great temptation to
treat this as a sole causation case rather than as a multiple causation
case, and hold the manufacturer liable for 100% of the damages.
The net effect of this difference in characterization is to require the
defendant to pay more than he should. Assume the evidence is con-
clusive in 5% of the cases. Under these circumstances the defendant
would pay 100% of the damages in five cases out of 100 and 10% of
the damages in the remaining 95 cases. If there are 100 cases and
the damages are $1,000 in each case, then the total damages in the
100 cases is $100,000. The defendant should pay $10,000 total dam-
ages since this is what he caused. He therefore ended up paying
$4,500 too much because he paid $5,000 in the five cases and $9,500
in the other 95 cases.
One could argue that the result is skewed because my figures
were wrong. Actually, the argument goes, there are two classes of
cases: those where the risk of harm approaches certainty and those
where the risk of harm is .0526315 per cent. If defendant pays this
latter percentage in the 95 cases ($52.63) and all damages in the 5
cases ($1,000) the result will come out exactly correct. The difficulty
with this argument-even if it were possible to come up with these
percentages with precision-is that there are not just two classes of
cases. There are 100 classes of cases because the risk of the protru-
sion harming a given passenger in a given accident varies with the
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precise circumstances of each case. Such factors as the size of the
passenger, his position in the vehicle, the existence and location of
other objects and persons in the vehicle, the speed of the vehicle, the
passenger's wearing apparel, force of impact, direction of impact,
characteristics of object with which the impact occurred, and an infi-
nite variety of other factors all affect the likelihood that a given pas-
senger will harm himself by coming into contact with the dashboard
protrusion. The exact probability of harm will vary subtly in each
case, and it is obviously impossible to pinpoint this with accuracy.
The best way to achieve consistency is to make an estimate of
probability of harm in all cases and require the defendant to pay
that amount in each case. This would result in the defendant paying
10% of the damages in the five cases where causation is certain as
well as in all other cases. It is, of course, inconceivable that a court
would do this. The more likely approach would be the selective use
of the multiple causation theory in cases where it appears conven-
ient, an approach that guarantees skewed results.
Another problem with the probabilistic approach is the increase
in litigation costs generated by the method. The cost of determining
the magnitude of risk of each possible cause of each accident or in-
jury is likely to be very great."' Furthermore, a great many more
potential defendants can be sued under the probabilistic theory.
Under present law, plaintiffs would only have a motive to sue people
who can be proved to be the probable causes of the accident or in-
jury. Under a probabilistic theory anyone who creates any risk of the
harm is a potential defendant. For example, the three manufacturers
in the cancer hypothetical would probably not be sued under present
law; under the probabilistic theory they would be. Each defendant
would incur substantial litigation costs in defending the case. None
of these costs would be incurred under present law.
Imposing liability on the basis of a rough approximation of the
chance that a defendant caused the plaintiff's harm would bring the
tort system one step closer to becoming a lottery. The next step
might be to determine fault on the basis of probability as well. To
illustrate, suppose a pedestrian is hit by a speeding car. The only
evidence is that the car was blue, there are 50 blue cars in town, and
100 people drive these cars. Using a probabilistic approach, we
might permit plaintiff to sue all 100 drivers of blue cars and recover
1% of his damages from each on the basis that there is -a 1% chance
261. See Kaye, supra note 256, at 514 n.76.
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that each is the negligent driver that caused the harm. Carrying the
case one step further, if we did not know the color of the car, we
might hold each driver in town liable for his respective share of the
damages on the theory that there is an equal risk that each is the
culprit. In the event that we are uncertain that the car was driven
negligently, we could discount the plaintiff's recovery accordingly. If
there is a 50% chance that a car involved in such an accident was
driven negligently, we could permit plaintiff to recover 50% of his
damages and apportion this among all drivers in town. This could be
justified on the basis that innocent accident victims who cannot
prove their cases through no fault of their own need to be compen-
sated. Carried to this extreme, however, the tort system becomes
purely a method for spreading risks. The costs of the adversary sys-
tem are too great to administer such a system efficiently." 2
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, tort law today is often thought of as a method
of social engineering rather than just a method for resolving disputes
among private individuals. 83 For example, much of products liability
law is based on the desirability of risk-spreading rather than as a
vehicle for dispute resolutio. 26 4 On this basis courts have imposed
strict liability in design and warning cases. They have done so, how-
ever, by using a negligence analogy-unreasonableness of conduct
evaluated in hindsight rather than with foresight. The functions of
the judge and jury are essentially the same in these cases as in negli-
gence cases.
The difficulty of applying the old approach to the new genera-
tion of torts is that it is often too crude an instrument to uniformly
implement the social policies that justify expanded liability. Use of
arbitrary inflexible rules to screen cases from juries-such as the
patent danger rule in products cases-may achieve undesirable re-
sults in many cases. For example, the patent danger rule in products
cases would prevent recovery by a bystander who was injured by an
obviously dangerous product which created the sole risk of injuring
262. See Epstein, supra note 229, at 660-61.
263. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
264. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963). See also Note, supra note 247, at 1004-06 (arguing that risk-spreading is a
primary justification for imposing liability on manufacturers of DES). This comment signifi-
cantly influenced the California Supreme Court in its formulation of market share liability, see
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608-14, 607 P.2d 924, 934-38, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 142-46, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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bystanders. The buyer of the product has no incentive to pay extra
for a safety device, unless the product is so dangerous that it is negli-
gent to operate it at all without the safety device. Here there is no
intelligent economic decision as to whether the cost of the device is
outweighed by the risk of potential harm it causes. On the other
hand, submission of all products cases to juries under the very gen-
eral reasonableness standard is equally undesirable because it pro-
vides manufacturers with too little certainty in selected cases, espe-
cially complex design and warning cases. Present law permits juries
to decide reasonableness of design of very complex products on the
basis of wildly conflicting expert testimony. It is very unlikely that
consistent results can be achieved in such cases, but even if they
could be, the design achieved by this process is not likely to be a very
intelligent one. A committee of laymen probably ought not have the
final word on the design of very complex products. 65 The negligence
analogy is simply inadequate to decide when social policy justifies
risk-spreading and when it does not.
When courts decide that social policy justifies an expanded
scope of liability they ought to devise an approach that will uni-
formly implement the change within the jurisdiction. The rules im-
plementing these policies must reach an accommodation between the
need for flexibility and certainty, just as all rules of law must. How-
ever, where flexibility lies in these rules, it ought to be exercised by
judges so that the underlying policy can be uniformly implemented,
at least unless the determination is one the jury is peculiarly able to
make.
One of the main criticisms of modern products liability law is
not that it imposes excessive liability, but rather that the law is so
uncertain that the possibility of excessive liability adversely affects
manufacturers and insurers. 6 If this is a problem, courts ought to
formulate rules that lead to greater predictability of result.
One method of accomplishing this is to be much more selective
in applying traditional rules to specific cases. For example, rather
than reject the patent danger rule in all cases or apply it in all cases,
courts could decide to apply it in cases where it makes sense in the-
ory and reject it in other cases, e.g., apply the rule in design cases
unless a third party is the most likely victim of the dangerous defect.
265. See Henderson, supra note 162, at 1557-58.
266. See I J. oF PROD. LAw 50 (1982); Dept. of Commerce, Options Paper on Product
Liability and Accidental Compensation Issues, 43 Fed. Reg. U 14,612, 14,613-14, 14,616
(1978).
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If this were done the market place could be used to determine how
much safety ought to be designed into a product except in cases
where the buyer is indifferent to questions of safety.
Another instance whei e the normal rules might be modified is
the situation where factually the liability imposed is so onerous that
the industry involved is unable to spread the risk. Asbestos litigation
presents a possible example. Potential liability for asbestos-related
deaths has been estimated in the $38,000,000,000.00 range, more
than the combined book value of the major defendants and their in-
surance companies involved in the asbestos litigation.267 A recent
New Jersey case used the 'hindsight" test for determining whether
there was a duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos, i.e., manu-
facturers are liable for damages resulting from a failure to warn oc-
curring prior to the time that it was scientifically knowable that as-
bestos was dangerous.268 While liability of bankrupting magnitude
might be justifiable in cases where the defendant has negligently or
intentionally caused harm, one must question the wisdom of impos-
ing such liability without fault. Risk-spreading hardly justifies the
result because it is not feasible for the companies involved to spread
risks of this magnitude. A better approach would be for courts to
decline to apply the hindsight test in design and warning cases where
the consequences for the industry would be potentially disastrous.
Perhaps a better approach in strict liability cases is for courts to
abandon the negligence analogy altogether and determine on the ba-
sis of several policy oriented factors whether liability is appropriate.
This is the approach courts use in deciding whether to impose strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities. The court determines
whether strict liability is appropriate on the basis of several fac-
tors.2 69 A similar scheme could be employed in products liability
cases.2 70 Even in negligence cases courts can successfully use a factor
test to determine when to expand the scope of liability beyond nor-
mal limits. This is what the California courts do to determine
whether to impose fault-based liability for pure pecuniary loss. This.
approach has the advantage of placing basic policy questions in the
267. See I J. PROD. LAw 2 (1982).
268. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
269. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 830 (1976); Wade, supra note
165, at 838.
270. For a discussion of how such a scheme might work, and what factors might be
considered, see Fischer, Products Liability: Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA.
L. REV. 93 (1979)
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hands of judges. These are appropriate officials for deciding such
questions, and because all trial court decisions are subject to ulti-
mate review in a single state supreme court, the chance that the pol-
icy will be uniformly implemented is maximized.
If the negligence analogy is retained there are other methods
that courts can use to increase the degree of jury control where this
is desirable. Use of special verdicts or general verdicts with interrog-
atories would be an effective control device in appropriate cases.
Judges could also increase the use of remittitur and directed ver-
dicts. This could be done now as a matter of discretion, but in the
case of directed verdicts appellate courts could force trial courts to
impose greater scrutiny by raising the standard of proof. Recovery
for pure mental distress, for example, must be limited in some way
because the potential liability is so great. If the court chooses not to
limit recovery by imposing arbitrary barriers-such as the require-
ment that the plaintiff be within the zone of danger or that he fear
for himself-then it might limit recovery by imposing a higher stan-
dard of proof. Plaintiffs might be required to prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that they suffered "serious mental distress."
Under this standard the highest court of a state could force trial
courts to direct verdicts against plaintiffs in all cases except where
the plaintiff introduces substantial objective evidence of the severity
of his distress. Plaintiffs might be permitted to prove this in a variety
of ways, such as by showing a resulting serious nervous disorder or
resulting physical harm. However, without such substantial evidence
the case would not go to the jury.
Regardless of what approach is taken, liability cannot consist-
ently be limited within appropriate bounds unless the judges who en-
force these rules appreciate the necessity for such limits. There is no
magic in any approach; a rule of law is nothing more than a group of
words that can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways. A judge who
believes that an accident victim ought to be compensated can often
achieve the desired result as easily under one approach as under an-
other. Bichler v. Ely Lilly"' provides an example. The court im-
posed liability because of the desirability of risk-spreading. It did so
by modifying a narrow traditional theory of recovery (concert of ac-
tion) so as to impose a very broad-based form of vicarious liability.
The tort system as we know it cannot survive as a pure compen-
271. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 571,436 N.E.2d 182,
450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). See supra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
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sation system.2 72 There are many areas of the law where the scope of
recovery can be broadened without producing adverse consequences.
But this can be accomplished only if the rules governing liability are
administered in such a way as to provide an appropriate degree of
certainty and to keep the scope of liability within reasonable bounds.
272. See Epstein, supra note 229, at 644-45, 659, 660-61.
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